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LASHED TO THE MAST AND CRYING FOR
HELP: HOW SELF-LIMITATION OF
AUTONOMY CAN PROTECT ELDERS FROM
PREDATORY LENDING
Kurt Eggert*
They tied me up, then, plumb
amidships, back to the mast, lashed to the mast,
and took themselves again to rowing. Soon,
as we came smartly within hailing distance,
the two Seir~nes, noting our fast ship
off their point, made ready, and they sang...
The lovely voices in ardor appealing over the water
made me crave to listen, and I tried to say
'Untie me!' to the crew, jerking my brows,-
but they bent steady to the oars. Then Perimds
got to his feet, he and Eurylokhos,
and passed more line about, to hold me still.
So all rowed on, until the Seiren~s
dropped under the sea rim, and their singing
dwindled away. '
* Associate Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law, (714)
628-2584, keggert@chapman.edu; J.D. 1984, University of California-
Berkeley, Boalt Hall. I would like to thank Anna Bums, Ben Diehl, Debra
Bierman, Gary Klein, Ken Zimmerman, Scott Altman, Tom Bell, James
Nickel, and Elizabeth Renuart for helpful ideas and criticism; Jan Costello,
Sande Buhai, and Catherine Fisk for thoughtful support; Denis Binder for close
reading; and Clare Pastore for patient editing and understanding. Any errors or
misconceptions are, however, my own.
1. HOMER, THE ODYSSEY bk. 12, at 214-15 (Robert Fitzgerald trans.,
1963). See Gerald Dworkin's discussion of this passage at note 220 and
accompanying text.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The elderly face the twin dangers of financial abuse and
overprotection. Seniors are too often targeted for fraud and other
forms of theft or deception since they frequently have significant
assets to plunder and some of them lack the competence or financial
skills needed to defend themselves from this abuse. At the same
time, providing a blanket protection of elders from financial abuse
has its own dangers. Limiting the kinds, scope, or substance of
transactions in which the elderly can engage also harms the elderly
by limiting their ability to chart their own financial futures and
dispose of their own property. The vast majority of senior citizens
are fully competent, and restraining their freedom to contract simply
because of their age could, on the whole, hinder more than help
them. Many seniors are threatened by ageism, and if their
independence is too constricted in an effort to protect them, seniors
may be deprived of the very freedom they need to live a full and
active life.
This dilemma, how to protect elders from financial elder abuse
and sharp business practices while at the same time preserving as
much of their autonomy as possible, is the subject of this Article. In
Section II, I discuss the various types of financial elder abuse,
distinguishing abuse by family members, friends, and custodial care
givers, which I call personal financial abuse, from that conducted by
businesses or entrepreneurs, which I term commercial financial
abuse.
A primary form of commercial financial elder abuse, and one
that has wreaked havoc among elderly and lower income
homeowners across the country, is predatory lending, the subject of
Section III. Lenders engaging in this practice use various
manipulative methods to induce borrowers to agree to loans that are
overpriced given the borrowers' risk profiles, or which affirmatively
harm the borrowers. Here, the conflict between protecting elders'
finances and their freedom to contract can be difficult to resolve.
While the elderly are among the favored targets of predatory
lenders, the legislation and rule-making designed to halt predatory
lending do not generally contain any special protections for older
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borrowers or provisions that specifically address their special needs
or characteristics, a matter I discuss in Sections IV and V. Instead,
the rules designed to halt predatory lending typically treat the elderly
victims just as any other victims, and the lenders that target the
elderly just as any other lenders. Rather than crafting predatory
lending statutes and rules that specifically address the concerns of the
elderly, some states rely on catch-all protections designed to prevent
fraud against the elderly by increasing the punishment of that fraud.
While it is a useful tactic, simply increasing damages awards
does not go to the heart of the problem facing elderly borrowers.
Most predatory lending takes advantage of the freedom to structure
loans in myriad ways so that lenders can baffle borrowers with
varied and confusing loan terms. For example, lenders often
overcharge their borrowers by hiding the true cost of loans with
complicated terms such as credit insurance, prepayment penalties,
and balloon payments. While a sophisticated borrower might agree
to such terms in return for a lower interest rate, many less
sophisticated borrowers become bound by these terms without either
understanding them or receiving any benefit in return. The
unsophisticated borrowers' freedom to bargain with their lenders
regarding all of these terms gives lenders the ability to extract
excessive fees or interest from the unwitting borrowers.
By confusing its borrowers, a lender can take advantage of them
without committing fraud, or at least not fraud that is easy to prove.
Elder borrowers who, while not incompetent, have lost some of their
mental acuity are especially susceptible to such sharp practices. Yet
the provisions specifically designed to protect the elderly may
provide little help to these borrowers because they focus on
preventing fraud, not lender-induced confusion.
Legislating additional protection against predatory lending
specifically for the elderly has its own potential pitfalls. Such
protection, if not carefully crafted, could limit their freedom to
borrow even when they are fully competent. Efforts to protect senior
homeowners must always be accompanied by a concern for their
autonomy; fully competent elders should not be unduly restricted in
order to protect their less able peers. I discuss the conflict between
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protecting elders from predatory lending, on the one hand, and
defending their autonomy, on the other, in Section VI. In Section
VII, I discuss the definition and role of autonomy and its special
importance for seniors. I outline various ways in which one can
increase one's overall autonomy by limiting a specific aspect of it. I
then attempt to construct a general test, or rather series of
interlocking questions, to determine which self-limitations of
autonomy should be enforced.
Based on this understanding of the potential benefits to self-
limitation of autonomy, I propose a method to protect seniors'
autonomy and their finances at the same time: Allow elders to
choose greater protections against predatory lending than may be
available to the non-elderly by allowing them to record an instrument
that would limit the terms of any loan that could be secured by their
principal residence. The instrument, which I call the Elder Home
Equity Loan Instrument (or Elder HELP Instrument), would allow
the senior homeowners to reform any loan documents that contain
interest rates or fees above a certain benchmark, or that contain other
potentially confusing or harsh terms. In this way, elders would be
given the power to renounce intentionally some portion of their
unbridled ability to enter into any available loan. In return, seniors
would retain the greater freedom of managing their own affairs with
less fear that they may fall victim to the guile of unscrupulous
lenders. They could lash themselves to the mast so that they would
not succumb to the dangerous blandishments of predatory lenders,
just as brave Ulysses saved himself despite the sweet songs of the
deadly Sirens.
To buttress my proposal, I look at one attempt to provide
consumer protection in another consumer financial arena,
commercial gambling. Some states, in response to the growing
number of compulsive or addicted gamblers, have passed self-
exclusion laws, which I discuss in Section VIII. Though they vary
dramatically by state, self-exclusion laws in general allow gamblers
to place their names on lists passed out to all of the casinos in the
state. When a compulsive gambler signs up for self-exclusion, the
gambler agrees that if she enters a casino, she can be ejected or even
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arrested, and that if she succeeds in winning any money before she is
caught, she forfeits all those winnings. The gambler renounces her
freedom to gamble, no doubt hoping to rid herself of the pernicious
effects of a horrible addiction.
In Sections IX and X, I propose that an analogous method be
designed to protect elderly homeowners concerned that they might
be coerced or manipulated into accepting a predatory loan. Under
this proposal, older homeowners would be able to limit their freedom
to enter into high-cost loans by signing and recording a simple
document, the Elder HELP Instrument, that would limit the terms of
any loan secured by their residence. All lenders would be on notice
of these limitations and so could freely choose whether to lend to the
self-restricted borrower. If any lender somehow managed to
convince the borrower to accept a loan with an excessive fee or
interest rate or other prohibited terms, the terms of the borrowers'
recorded self-limitation would govern, and the borrower could have
the loan reformed. By restricting in advance their own freedom to
contract with lenders, elder homeowners could be free from the
greatest abuses of predatory lending.
II. FINANCIAL ELDER ABUSE AS A COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISE
While the physical abuse or neglect of the elderly received
growing attention in this country during the last few decades,
financial abuse of the elderly was much less discussed.2 Despite its
relatively low profile, financial elder abuse is a nationwide problem,
and may encompass almost one-third of all cases of elder
mistreatment. 3 There are two primary types of financial elder abuse.
4
One type, which I call personal financial abuse, is abuse committed
2. See Carolyn L. Dessin, Financial Abuse of the Elderly, 36 IDAHO L.
REv. 203, 204 (2000).
3. See Heather Elayne Davis, The California Elder Abuse and Dependent
Adult Civil Protection Act and Its Relationship to Rule Job-5 of the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934, 42 ORANGE COUNTY LAW. 40, 40-41 (2000)
(citing The National Elder Abuse Incidence Study: Final Report September
1998, Table 4-2).
4. For the warning signs of financial elder abuse, see Ken Ransford,
FinancialAbuse of Elderly Adults, 23 COLO. LAW. 1077, 1077-78 (1994).
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by someone with a personal relation to the victim, such as a family
member, friend, caretaker, or a "befriender" who has gained the
victim's trust in order to take advantage of that trust.5 This abuse
typically takes the form of theft or coerced transfer of the victim's
assets, including funds in the victim's bank accounts or title or equity
in the victim's house.6 It is often accompanied by other forms of
elder abuse, such as physical attacks, threats, or psychological
assault.7
A second type of financial elder abuse, which I label
commercial financial elder abuse, is that practiced by more
organized businesses. The commercial abuser acts under color of a
business enterprise to obtain access to the elder's assets. Rather than
resorting to outfight theft, the commercial abuser typically seeks to
gain the elder victim's money by providing or promising to provide
goods or services, and either fails to provide the goods or services,
provides defective goods or services, or charges significantly more
than the market price for them.8  Commercial abusers target the
elderly both because there is a perception that the elderly are easier
to take advantage of and because the elderly have significant assets.
9
5. Carolyn Dessin calls this the "intentional misuse of an elder's assets by
a fiduciary or caregiver." Dessin, supra note 2, at 207. It has also been termed"exploitation" or "material abuse." Sana Loue, Elder Abuse and Neglect in
Medicine and Law, 22 J. LEGAL MED. 159, 166 (2001).
6. "Financial abuse or exploitation is theft or conversion of property by
the elder's relatives, caregivers, or others; it can range from expropriating
small amounts of cash to inducing the elder to sign away bank accounts or
other property." Seymour Moskowitz, Reflecting Reality: Adding Elder Abuse
and Neglect to Legal Education, 47 LOY. L. REv. 191, 197 (2001).
7. See id. at 197-98.
8. Commercial financial elder abuse is rife in the areas of telemarketing
and home repair by unlicensed contractors. See Richard A. Statues, Note,
Consumer Fraud and the Elderly: The Need for a Uniform System of
Enforcement and Increased Civil and Criminal Penalties, 4 ELDER L.J. 201,
206-10 (1996). For a discussion of telemarketing fraud and its effects on the
elderly, see Jeffrey L. Bratkiewicz, Essay, "Here's a Quarter, Call Someone
Who Cares"; Who is Answering the Elderly's Call for Protection from
Telemarketing Fraud?, 45 S.D. L. REv. 586 (2000).
9. Terrie Lewis notes that "the elderly are worth exploiting. They average
a net worth of over $250,000. Over seventy percent own their own vehicles
and their own homes. The elderly own retirement accounts, mutual funds, and
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III. PREDATORY LENDING: ITS DEFINITION AND PRACTICES
One of the most virulent forms of financial elder abuse is
predatory lending. 10 Predatory lending is notoriously difficult to
define, but I offer the following attempt: 11 predatory lending is the
use by lenders of deceptive, manipulative, or coercive practices in
order to induce borrowers to accept loans that (1) have interest rates
or fees significantly above the current market rate given the risk
stocks." Terrie Lewis, Note, Fifty Ways to Exploit Your Grandmother: The
Status of Financial Abuse of the Elderly in Minnesota, 28 WM. MITCHELL L.
REv. 911, 914 (2001) (citations omitted).
10. Cassandra Jones Havard notes the distinction between legitimate
subprime lending and predatory lending, stating:
Generally, fair sub-prime lenders engage in risk-based lending,
making loans that are appropriately priced to compensate for the risk
of lending to a credit-blemished borrower. Predatory lenders engage
in asset-based lending. They charge fees and interest rates far beyond
the risk incurred, and price the loan based on the assets of the
borrower, which are usually tied to the borrower's equity in a home.
Cassandra Jones Havard, Invisible Markets Netting Visible Results: When Sub-
Prime Lending Becomes Predatory, 26 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 1057, 1065
(2001).
11. Engel and McCoy note, "In 2000, Senator Phil Gramm, then the
chairman of the Senate Banking Committee, famously asserted that predatory
lending could not be addressed until it could be defined. With that remark,
Senator Gramm shrewdly seized on the difficulties in defining predatory
lending ... ." Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three
Markets: The Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REv.
1255, 1259-60 (2002). In a previous article on predatory lending, I discussed
the difficulty in defining this problem and proposed that investors in the
secondary markets bear increased liability for predatory lending so that they
will be encouraged to purchase loans only from non-predatory lenders. See
Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: Predatory Lending, Securitization, and
the Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REv. 503, 511-12, 608
(2002). For other proposed solutions, see Daniel S. Ehrenberg, If the Loan
Doesn't Fit, Don't Take It: Applying the Suitability Doctrine to the Mortgage
Industry to Eliminate Predatory Lending, 10 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING &
COMMUNITY DEV. L. 117, 119-20 (2001). See also Engel & McCoy, supra, at
3 (proposing that the suitability doctrine currently governing securities brokers
be applied to lenders in the residential loan market); Margot Saunders &
National Consumer Law Center, The Increase in Predatory Lending and
Appropriate Remedial Actions, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 111, 128-39, 142-46
(2002) (proposing changes to federal law on several fronts to reduce predatory
lending).
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profile of the borrowers or other terms significantly worse than the
market norm offered by legitimate lenders, or (2) which leave the
borrowers worse off than they would have been without any new
loans, or (3) both. 12 These factors should be balanced against each
other so that a loan with grossly excessive interest rates or fees,
given the risk characteristics of the borrower, would need less in the
way of lender deception, manipulation, or coercion to be considered
predatory.
A loan may affirmatively harm a borrower whether or not the
loan is overpriced where, for example, the borrower is unable to
repay the new loan and will lose her house as a result, or where it
refinances existing loans with interest rates below the current market
rate. 13
12. A recent federal task force that investigated predatory lending defined it
as follows:
Predatory lending-whether undertaken by creditors, brokers, or even
home improvement contractors-involves engaging in deception or
fraud, manipulating the borrower through aggressive sales tactics, or
taking unfair advantage of a borrower's lack of understanding about
loan terms. These practices are often combined with loan terms that,
alone or in combination, are abusive or make the borrower more
vulnerable to abusive practices.
Joint U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development-U.S. Department
of the Treasury Task Force on Predatory Lending, Curbing Predatory Home
Mortgage Lending 1 (June 2000), available at
http://www.hud.gov/librarylbookshelfl 8/pressrel/treasrpt.pdf (last visited Mar.
9, 2002) [hereinafter Curbing Predatory Home Mortgage Lending]. By
comparison, Engel and McCoy define predatory lending as a
syndrome of abusive loan terms or practices that involve one or more
of the following five problems:
(1) loans structured to result in seriously disproportionate net harm
to borrowers,
(2) harmful rent seeking,
(3) loans involving fraud or deceptive practices,
(4) other forms of lack of transparency in loans that are not
actionable as fraud, and
(5) loans that require borrowers to waive meaningful legal redress.
Engel & McCoy, supra note 11, at 1260.
13. See Alvin C. Harrell, Subprime Lending Developments with
Implications for Creditors and Consumers, 52 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 238,
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The primary goal of predatory lending is to convince or coerce
borrowers to obtain loans that cost more than the market rate given
the borrowers' risk characteristics. 14
Common methods of inducing borrowers to pay higher than
market interest rates or fees or accept affirmatively harmful loans
include:' 5
1) Loan Flipping: The rapid refinancing of borrowers'
loans, adding new fees and costs to each refinancing so
that the lender bleeds dry the equity in the house.
16
Flipping appears to be widespread in the subprime
market among elder borrowers.
17
2) High Prepayment Penalties: This predatory method is
rare in the prime market, but runs rampant in the
subprime market.' 8  Many subprime lenders charge
242 n.45 (1998); see also infra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing
"equity stripping").
14. See Testimony before the House Comm. on Banking and Fin. Servs.,
106th Cong., (2000) (testimony of Ellen Seidman, Director of the Office of
Thrift Supervision), available at 2000 WL 19304110 [hereinafter Testimony of
Ellen Seidman]; see also Eggert, supra note 11 (defining the purpose of
predatory lenders).
15. There are numerous similar lists of the various aspects of predatory
loans, and this author does not claim originality in the following list.
16. See Curbing Predatory Home Mortgage Lending, supra note 12, at 21.
17. One study found that thirty-five percent of elder subprime refinance
borrowers reported refinancing two or more times within the previous three
years. See Older Subprime Refinance Mortgage Borrowers, 74 AARP DATA
DIGEST 4 (2002), available at http://research.aarp.org/consume/
dd74_finance.html#pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2002). Rapid refinancing is
much more harmful in the subprime market than it is in the prime market due
to the extensive use of prepayment penalties and other high fees. See supra
note 18 and accompanying text (discussing prepayment penalties).
18. While eighty percent of subprime loans carry prepayment penalties, as
few as two percent of the prime market loans carry these penalties. See James
H. Carr & Lopa Kolluri, Fannie Mae Foundation, Predatory Lending: An
Overview 3 (2001), at http://www.fanniemaefoundation.org/news/
pr/2001sum/010802.shtml; John Hechinger, Home Bound: Nasty Surprise
Haunts Some Folks' Mortgage: A Prepayment Penalty, WALL ST. J., Aug. 1,
2001, at AT, available at 2001 WL-WSJ 2871388; Brad Scriber, Prepayment
Penalties a Boon To Lenders, Burden to Consumers, AM. BANKER, Nov. 2,
2001, at 16, available at 2001 WL 26574837. Engel and McCoy explain this
phenomenon, stating "In competitive loan markets, market forces and
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prepayment penalties, often as high as five percent of
the loan, if borrowers pay off their loans before a set
period of time passes.19
3) Equity Stripping: The process of convincing
homeowners to enter into loans that cause them to lose
their homes when they cannot pay the loans.
20
4) Packing: The process of increasing the amount of loans
by adding unnecessary charges for products, such as
credit insurance, that the borrower does not need, want,
or often even realize that she is purchasing.
2'
5) Steering: The process by which loan brokers direct
borrowers to lenders who will provide high-cost loans,
even though the borrowers would qualify for much
lower interest rates.22  Steering by brokers is so
effective that perhaps thirty-five to fifty percent of
borrowers induced into accepting subprime loans could
have qualified for much less expensive prime rate
loans. 
23
6) Balloon payments: The requirement that the borrower
pay the entire loan amount before the monthly payments
disclosures are generally sufficient to curb such abuses. In the market for
predatory loans, however, disclosures are usually incomprehensible and market
forces do not provide sufficient constraints against that conduct. .. ." Engel &
McCoy, supra note 11, at 1270.
19. See Hechinger, supra note 18.
20. See Harrell, supra note 13, at 242 n.45.
21. See Curbing Predatory Home Mortgage Lending, supra note 12, at 88.
Unscrupulous lenders charge borrowers a single premium large enough to pay
for insurance for the term of the loan, making it difficult for the borrower to
cancel the insurance and increasing the amount of the loan. For a complete
discussion of consumer credit insurance, as well as charges that it is used in a
predatory manner, see Anthony Rollo, A Primer on Consumer Credit
Insurance, 54 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 52, 58 (2000).
22. See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, The CRA Implications of
Predatory Lending, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1571, 1578-80 (2002). Engel and
McCoy suggest that banks be required to determine whether applications for
subprime loans from a bank be reviewed by the bank to determine whether the
applicants would be eligible for prime rate, and hence much less expensive,
loans. See id. at 1598.
23. See Carr & Kolluri, supra note 18, at 7.
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would have gradually paid off the loan. Some abusive
lenders include this requirement to ensure that their
borrowers, who rarely can make such a large lump-sum
payment, must refinance their loans, offering a new
opportunity for the lender to charge points and fees,
thus increasing the amount of the loans.24
7) Fraud or Deception: Outright deception is the most
blatant form of predatory lending and may occur either
through express statements or by concealing
information from borrowers that would reveal the true
cost or effects of the loan.
25
Predatory lending is a growing problem that harms not only its
victims but also their communities. Its victims are burdened with
overpriced mortgages and, even if they are able to pay these loans,
they feel the financial loss caused thereby for years afterward. This
direct cost was recently estimated at $9.1 billion annually. 27 A much
greater and separate harm, that of foreclosure, is suffered by those
24. See Eggert, supra note 11, at 519.
25. Engel and McCoy state:
The most notorious deceptions include fraudulent disclosures, failures
to disclose information as required by law, bait-and-switch tactics, and
loans made in collusion with home-repair scams. There are reports of
lenders financing fees without borrowers' knowledge, secretly
conveying title to borrowers' property, and deliberately concealing
liens on borrowers' homes.
Engel & McCoy, supra note 11, at 1267.
26. See Testimony of Ellen Seidman, supra note 14; Todd Silberman,
Slowing Economy Blamed For Rise In Mortgage Fraud, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Apr. 1, 2001, at B8 (quoting James Croft, head of the
Mortgage Asset Research Institute, which researches mortgage fraud); Peggy
Twohig, Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission before the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System on Predatory Lending
Practices in the Home-Equity Lending Market (Sept. 7, 2000), at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/09/predatorylending.htm (last visited Sept. 29,
2002).
27. See Eric Stein, Quantifying the Economic Cost of Predatory Lending, a
Report from the Coalition for Responsible Lending (July 25, 2001), at
http://www.responsiblelending.org (revised Oct. 30, 2001). The estimates in
the report are admittedly "rough, though conservative .... " Id. at 13.
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unable to pay their loans. Recently, the rate of serious delinquencies
among subprime loans escalated to record highs.
28
IV. PREDATORY LENDING IS OFTEN TARGETED AT THE ELDERLY
Predatory lending is often aimed at the elderly, some of whom
are more vulnerable to such abusive tactics than are younger
borrowers. Unscrupulous lenders can target elderly homeowners by
obtaining databases that sort homeowners by age, race, or gender.
29
Many seniors purchased their home years ago, have paid off their
loans, and own their homes free and clear of any debt.30 Moreover,
even where elder homeowners have loans, the loan amount as a
percentage of the home's value is on average much smaller for
homeowners sixty-five and older than for the general population,
with a median loan amount of only 33.8% of the total value of the
28. See SPECIAL REPORT. REO & Foreclosure Management, the
Challenge Ahead, NAT'L MORTGAGE NEWS, Aug. 26, 2002, at 15, available at
2002 WL 8160239. The number of homes in foreclosure has skyrocketed,
despite what had been a booming economy and a corresponding sizeable
increase in home values that should have provided a buffer to financially
strapped homeowners. For example, the number of foreclosures in or near the
Chicago area nearly doubled between 1993 and 1998. See U.S. Department of
Housing & Urban Development, Unequal Burden: Income and Racial
Disparities in Subprime Lending in America 8 (April 2000), at http://
www.hud.gov/library/bookshelfl8/pressrel/subprime.html (last visited Aug.
16, 2001); see also Thomas Grillo, Foreclosure on the Rise: Losing a Job Can
Spell Disaster if You're Heavily Mortgaged in a High-Priced Place Like
Mass., BOSTON GLOBE, July 14, 2002, at H.1, available at 2002 WL 4138291
(discussing the effects of the rise in foreclosures on homeowners).
29. See Paul D. Davies, Subprime Lenders Prey on Hard-Luck Consumers,
PHIL. DAILY NEWS, Feb. 7, 2001, at 1, available at 2001 WL 12167836.
30. See Mortgage Lending Abuses. Testimony Before the House Comm. on
Banking & Fin. Servs., 106th Cong. (2000) (testimony of Margot Saunders,
Managing Attorney, National Consumer Law Center), available at 2000 WL
19304095 [hereinafter Testimony of Margot Saunders]. The latest American
Housing Survey reveals that seventy-six percent of homeowners sixty-five or
older own their houses free and clear of any mortgages, compared to thirty-
seven percent of the general population, including the elderly. See U.S.
Census Bureau, American Housing Survey for the United States: 1999,
available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/ahs/ahs99/tab315.html
(last visited Sept. 29, 2002).
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house, compared to 59.4% for all homeowners/borrowers. 31 This
sizeable equity makes the elders' homes tempting targets compared
to newly purchased homes saddled with purchase money loans.
32
Many senior homeowners need to hire contractors because they
own older homes that require some renovation, especially if the
owner is, due to age, unable to make the improvements herself.
33
Often, retirees find themselves living on a fixed income, without
sizeable cash reserves, and so they must borrow to finance the
necessary improvements.
34
Predatory lenders seek out homes needing repairs and directly
approach the homeowners. 35  As a result, many elders find
themselves personally targeted by subprime lenders. In one study,
sixty-one percent of refinance subprime borrowers sixty-five years
and older reported that they were approached by a broker or lender,
rather than the borrower initiating contact. 36 This number is nearly
double the rate reported by prime rate refinance borrowers of the
same age. 37  Subprime lenders and brokers seek, as their perfect
client, "an uneducated widow who is on a fixed income.., who has
31. See id.
32. See Saunders & National Consumer Law Center, supra note 11, at 119.
33. See Mortgage Lending Abuses, Testimony Before the House Comm. on
Banking & Fin. Servs., 106th Cong. (2000) (testimony of William J. Brennan,
Jr., Director, Home Defense Program of the Atlanta Legal Aid Society, Inc.),
available at 2000 WL 19304097 [hereinafter Testimony of William J.
Brennan]; see also AARP Research, Home Improvement Contractors (Jan.
1999), at http://research.aarp.org/consume/fs75_contractl.html (last visited
Sept. 29, 2002) (finding that elder homeowners are more likely to own homes
and that their homes are, on average, older and more often require repairs).
The study also found that elder homeowners are less able or willing to do their
own repairs, stating "According to 1995 AHS data, of homeowners 75 and
older reporting home repair work over a two-year period, eight in ten (79%)
did none of the repairs themselves." Id.
34. Low income elders are much more likely than their younger equivalents
to own houses and thus be ready targets for home equity fraud. While only
thirty-nine percent of households with incomes under the federal poverty level
are homeowners, fifty-eight percent of older Americans below the poverty
level own homes. See Testimony of Margot Saunders, supra note 30.
35. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 22, at 1584.
36. See Older Subprime Refinance Mortgage Borrowers, supra note 17, at
37. See id.
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her house paid off, is living off of credit cards, but having a difficult
time keeping up her payments, and who must make a car payment in
addition to her credit card payments. 38
Subprime lenders are successful in their sales efforts aimed at
the elderly. While only twenty-one percent of prime borrowers were
at least fifty-five years old, thirty-five percent of subprime borrowers
were fifty-five or older.39 Because they are more likely to enter into
subprime loans, older homeowners are also more likely to be victims
of predatory lending. Not all subprime lenders are predatory, but
virtually all predatory lenders deal in the subprime market, because
there they can charge high interest rates and fees.40  One study in
California concluded that predatory terms or conditions were
included in more than one-third of the subprime loans reviewed
made to borrowers refinancing existing loans.
41
38. Predatory Lending Practices: Hearing Before S. Special Comm. on
Aging, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of Jim Dough), available at 1998 WL
8993304.
39. Curbing Predatory Home Mortgage Lending, supra note 12, at 36.
40. See Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now
(ACORN), Separate and Unequal: Predatory Lending in America 2 (Nov.
2001), at http://www.acom.org/acoml O/predatorylending/plreports/report.htm
(last visited Sept. 29, 2002) (stating that "[w]hile not all subprime lenders are
predatory," the overwhelming majority of predatory lenders are subprime, "and
the subprime industry is a fertile breeding ground for predatory
practices ... ."); see also Cathy Lesser Mansfield, The Road to Subprime
"HEL" Was Paved With Good Congressional Intentions: Usury Deregulation
and the Subprime Home Equity Market, 51 S.C. L. REv. 473, 536-37 (2000)
(reviewing SEC filings and finding that subprime loans in the reviewed
securitized pools had a median interest rate somewhere between eleven percent
and 11.99%, while the rate for conventional thirty-year mortgages averaged
7.54%). In addition to higher interest rates, subprime loans also feature points
and fees that are three to five times as much as those typically charged in the
prime market. See Davies, supra note 29, at 1; ACORN, supra, at 28.
41. See California Reinvestment Committee, Stolen Wealth: Inequities in
California's Subprime Mortgage Market (Nov. 2001), available at
http://www.calreinvest.org/PredatoryLending/StudyOnWeb7.24.01 .html
(studying in depth 117 homeowners in four California communities and
discussing the prevalence of predatory lending in the subprime lending
industry). The study concluded that thirty-three percent of the homeowners
"felt that they were victims of predatory lending or lending discrimination" and
that over thirty-three percent of the homeowners studied appeared to be
"predatory lending victims," such as those trapped in a "worst case scenario,"
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Predatory lenders take advantage of the frailties they sometimes
find in elderly borrowers. One such lender explained, "If someone
appeared uneducated, inarticulate, was a minority, or was
particularly old or young, I would try to include all the insurance
coverages [my company offered] .... The more gullible the
customer appeared, the more coverages I would try to include in the
loan."42 Elders who suffer from Alzheimer's and other deficits of
memory and cognition are favored customers for predatory lenders,
as they are least able to defend themselves from fraud, deception, or
other sharp business practices. 43  Donna Harkness explains that
"poor, elderly persons are often illiterate and/or unsophisticated
and/or too ill, either physically or mentally, to carefully read and
comprehend a complicated sheaf of mortgage loan documents." 44 A
recent study of elder borrowers reveals that subprime borrowers are
more likely than prime borrowers to be unfamiliar with the mortgage
process and confused by key terms, such as prepayment penalties,
interest rate, and points and fees.45
with two or more of a set of factors indicative of predatory loans, such as "high
points and fees," deception by the lender, subprime loans for prime lenders,
and bait and switch tactics. Id.
42. Jordan Rau, Stalking the Predators: State Legislature Eyes More
Restrictions on Lending, NEWSDAY, June 27, 2001, at A06, available at 2001
WL 9238572 (quoting an assistant manager at a Citigroup subsidiary regarding
aggressive tactics she used to trick customers into taking out loans).
43. According to William J. Brennan, Jr., Director, Home Defense Program
of the Atlanta Legal Aid Society, Inc., "The common characteristics of these
victims are a need for money (either real or suggested by the lender) combined
with a lack of financial sophistication, often exacerbated by diminished mental
capacity as a result of Alzheimer's and other dementia-related diseases."
Testimony of William J Brennan, supra note 33.
44. Donna S. Harkness, Predatory Lending Prevention Project: Prescribing
a Cure for the Home Equity Loss Ailing the Elderly, 10 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1,
43 (2000).
45. See Older Subprime Refinance Mortgage Borrowers, supra note 17, at
3. This study of 1008 subprime and prime borrowers, conducted for AARP
and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, concluded that subprime
borrowers were "less likely.., to report completely understanding three key
loan terms: prepayment penalties, points and fees, and interest rate[s]" and
that "[s]ubprime borrowers were less likely to be familiar with their credit
records, loan qualification requirements, mortgage rates and costs, types of
mortgages available, and basic mortgage terms." Id.
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Not only is predatory lending often targeted at the elderly, its
effects are often more devastating to older homeowners. Because
they often live on fixed incomes, the elderly typically are less likely
to rebound from financial loss than are younger victims.4 6 While
foreclosure, the common result of predatory lending, often causes
great damage even to young homeowners,4 7 it is even more
frequently catastrophic to the elderly, who are often unlikely ever to
be able to purchase a replacement house.48 Seniors who have lived
in their homes for years and raised their children there may place an
enormous emotional value on their houses, quite apart from their
homes' financial worth.4 9 Elder homeowners often have held onto
their homes, hoping to "age in place" and take care of themselves.
50
When the elderly lose their homes, typically while losing a
sizeable amount of equity at the same time, they often do not have
alternative places to live. 51 Furthermore, the trauma of being forced
out and the difficulty of suddenly packing all of their belongings and
finding a new residence, are generally worse for elders than they are
for their younger counterparts. 52 The independence of elders is often
dependent upon their having a place to live that they can afford, so
that when they find themselves homeless, they may have no
alternative but to move to a much more restrictive housing
alternative, such as a board and care facility or a rest home. 53 Elders
46. See Seymour Moskowitz, Saving Granny from the Wolf Elder Abuse
and Neglect-The Legal Framework, 31 CONN. L. REV. 77, 101 (1998).
47. See Julia Patterson Forrester, Mortgaging the American Dream: A
Critical Evaluation of the Federal Government's Promotion of Home Equity
Financing, 69 TUL. L. REV. 373, 386 (1994).
48. See Eggert, supra note 11, at 581.
49. See Moskowitz, supra note 46, at 101.
50. For the challenges to providing housing to the elderly and allowing
them to "age in place," see Cori Menken, Note, Senior Citizen Overlay
Districts and Assisted Living Facilities: Different but the Same, 21 PACE L.
REV. 481, 507 (2001).
51. "'A tight housing market and a shortage of appropriate housing is a
serious problem for older Americans."' Id. at 482 (quoting Patricia Baron
Pollack & Alice Nudelman Gorman, Community-Based Housing for the
Elderly, 420 AM. PLANNING ASS'N, PLANNING ADVISORY SERV. 1 (1989)).
52. See Moskowitz, supra note 46, at 101.
53. See Eggert, supra note 11, at 581-82.
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fear the loss of autonomy that financial abuse can cause them, and
frequently fail even to report financial elder abuse out of fear that
reporting such abuse may "lead to the initiation of protective
proceedings or nursing home confinement."
54
V. ANTI-PREDATORY LENDING LAWS ARE NOT SPECIFICALLY
TAILORED TO PROTECT THE ELDERLY
While a distressing amount of predatory lending is targeted at
the elderly, who generally suffer more from its effects, the laws
designed to curb this lending are not tailored to give special
protection to the elderly or to address the greater consequences
suffered by the elderly. Instead, most predatory lending laws are
designed to give additional protections to any homeowner paying
high interest rates or fees for home loans and to bar the use of certain
terms in high-cost loans.
The first major attempt to stop predatory lending was the Home
Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994 (HOEPA).55 While
HOEPA's flaws are well documented, it still has served as a template
for subsequent legislation intended to cure HOEPA's defects.
56
HOEPA is designed to identify high-cost mortgage loans by
determining whether the loans exceed specific interest rate and fee
triggers set much higher than the fees or rates of most legitimate
loans.57  Once high-cost mortgages are identified, the affected
54. Ransford, supra note 4, at 1078.
55. Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act,
Pub. L. No. 103-325, §§ 151-58, 108 Stat. 2190-2198 (1994) (enacted as a part
of the Federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. § 1601; Reg. Z, 12
C.F.R. § 226). For a broad overview of HOEPA, see Jean Constantine-Davis,
HOEPING for Better Days: The Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act
of 1994 (HOEPA), in 2 CONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVICES LITIGATION 243
(1999), and Gary Klein, The Home Ownership And Equity Protection Act of
1994: Enhanced TILA Protections, in 2 CONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVICES
LITIGATION 343 (1999).
56. For a discussion of the flaws in HOEPA, see Eggert, supra note 11, at
584-92.
57. See 15 U.S.C. § 1602(2)(A); 66 Fed. Reg. 65,604, 65,606 (Dec. 20,
2001); infra note 64 and accompanying text.
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borrowers are given additional protections 58-including additional
disclosures provided three days before the loan is to close-that are
designed to be understood by less sophisticated borrowers. These
disclosures give borrowers six days from the time they are given
accurate price information in which to rescind, rather than the three
days given by the more generic Federal Truth in Lending Law. 59 For
high-cost loans, HOEPA also restricts the use of some terms
associated with predatory lending, such as prepayment penalties,
balloon payments with a short duration, and higher interest rates that
spring into existence upon the borrower's default. 60  HOEPA
provides enhanced damages through refund of the finance charges
and fees that were paid by the borrower, and also provides expanded
rescission rights.
61
When HOEPA was originally passed, the interest and fee
triggers were set so high that HOEPA was fairly ineffective, as many
predatory lenders merely set their fees and interest rates slightly
below the triggers and still reaped a tidy profit.62  The volume of
subprime lending surged after HOEPA was passed, as did the
amount of predatory lending. 63 In 2001, the Federal Reserve Board
amended Regulation Z, which implements HOEPA, to lower the
APR trigger for first-lien mortgage loans from ten percentage points
to eight percentage points above the rate for Treasury securities with
58. See CAROL V. CLARK, PADRICK'S RESPA, TILA, HOEPA AND ECOA
IN REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS WITH FORMS § 2-30, at 244 (4th ed. 2001)
(stating that "[t]he Act identifies a class of high-cost mortgage loans through
rate and fee triggers, and provides consumers entering into these transactions
with special protections."); see also Harkness, supra note 44, at 11-12 (stating
that "[b]oth Truth in Lending and HOEPA predominantly mandate disclosures
without proscribing or prescribing any further conduct.").
59. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (2000).
60. See 15 U.S.C. § 1639(c)-(f).
61. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(b); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(3) (2000).
62. See Curbing Predatory Home Mortgage Lending, supra note 12, at 85.
63. See Allen Fishbein & Harold Bunce, Subprime Market Growth and
Predatory Lending 273, at http://www.huduser.org/publications/pdf/
brd/13Fishbein.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2002). Fishbein and Bunce state, "In
1994, the $35 billion in subprime mortgages represented less than 5 percent of
all mortgage originations. By 1999, subprime lending had increased to $160
billion, almost 13 percent of the mortgage origination market." Id. at 274.
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a comparable maturity, and amended the fee trigger to include
optional insurance and other debt-protection products to be financed
by the loan.
64
Because of HOEPA's initial ineffectiveness, other governmental
bodies stepped into the breach. North Carolina was the first state to
pass anti-predatory lending legislation, with its ground-breaking
measure, S.B. 1149.65 In addition to fee and interest rate triggers,
North Carolina added as a trigger any prepayment fees lasting more
than thirty months which exceed two percent of the amount
prepaid.66
For loans that trip the triggers, North Carolina bars balloon
payment provisions, increases in interest rates upon default, and
negative amortization in high-cost loans.67 Lenders are also required
to receive, for each high-cost loan, a certification "from a counselor
64. 66 Fed. Reg. 65,606, 65,608-65,610, 65,612, 65,613 (Dec. 20, 2001).
For a discussion of these changes, see Donald C. Lampe & Stephen F.J.
Ornstein, Federal Reserve Board Amendments to Regulation ZIHOEPA
Regulations, 55 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 223 (2001). Compliance with these
changes did not become mandatory until October 1, 2002. See 66 Fed. Reg.
65,604 (Dec. 20, 2001).
65. See 1999 N.C. Sess. Laws 332, available at
http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/html1999/bills/AllVersions/Senate/S 1149vc.html
(last visited Aug. 30, 2002); see also Harkness, supra note 44, at 29-32
(providing a brief history of how American mortgage laws led to the
proliferation of predatory lending practices and ways in which these practices
can be curtailed); Donald C. Lampe, The North Carolina "Predatory Lending"
Usury Statute--S.B. 1149, 55 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 81 (2001) (giving a
brief overview of North Carolina predatory lending laws, and explaining how
these laws protect consumers' residential homes); Stephen F.J. Ornstein,
Summary of North Carolina Senate Bill 1149 Prohibiting Predatory Lending,
54 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 302 (2000) (summarizing and highlighting the
important provisions of North Carolina's predatory lending laws); Richard R.
Daugherty, Note, Will North Carolina's Predatory Home Lending Act Protect
Borrowers From the Vulnerability Caused by the Inadequacy of Federal Law?,
4 N.C. BANKING INST. 569, 604 (2000) (explaining the practice of predatory
lending and noting how numerous federal laws often hinder the application of
North Carolina's predatory lending laws).
66. See 1999 N.C. Sess. Laws 332 § 24-1.1E(a)(6)(b)(3), available at
http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/html1999/bills/AllVersions/Senate/S 1149vc.html
(last visited Aug. 30, 2002).
67. See id. at § 24-1.1E(a)(7)(b).
Winter 2003]
712 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:693
approved by the North Carolina Housing Finance Agency that the
borrower has received counseling on the advisability of the loan
transaction and the appropriate loan for the borrower" and lenders
cannot make loans without "due regard to repayment ability." 68 In
addition to special protections for high-cost loans, North Carolina's
legislation also bans some practices in all residential lending,
including flipping loans, packing loans with single-premium credit
insurance, and encouraging a borrower to default on an existing
loan.
69
While lenders have widely predicted that lenders would
withdraw from states that enact strong anti-predatory legislation, a
recent study concluded that subprime lenders have not fled from
70North Carolina nor stranded its borrowers. More importantly,
lenders have not even raised their prices in reaction to the increased
protections.7' Instead, by curbing abusive lending, North Carolina
has likely saved its borrowers an estimated $100 million.
72
Even though the North Carolina law is designed to correct
HOEPA's flaws and protect elderly homeowners who are prime
targets for predatory lending, North Carolina's anti-predatory
legislation does not include any provisions directed specifically
toward elderly borrowers. Similarly, a myriad of other enactments in
other states designed to prevent predatory lending also lack any
special provisions specifically aimed at protecting the elderly,
including those enacted in California,
7 3 Colorado, 74 Connecticut,75
68. Id. at § 24-1.1E(a)(7)(c)(1).
69. See id. at § 24-10.2(a)-(d).
70. Keith Ernst et al., North Carolina's Subprime Home Loan Market After
Predatory Lending Reform: A Report from the Center for Responsible Lending
3 (Aug. 13, 2002), at http://www.responsiblelending.org/other/media.cfm (last
visited Aug. 30, 2002).
71. See id. at 5.
72. See id. at 8.
73. See A.B. 489, Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2001) (enacted as CAL.
FIN. CODE § 4970 (West 2002)).
74. See H.B. 02-1259, Ch. 323, Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2002),
available at http://www.state.co.us/gov-dir/legdir/olls/sl2002a/sl.323.htm
(last visited Sept. 15, 2002).
75. See Sub. H.B. 6131, Pub. Act 01-34, Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Conn.
2001), available at http://www.cga.state.ct.us/2001/act/Pa/2001PA-00034-
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the District of Columbia,76  Florida,77  Georgia, Maryland,79
81 83 84Michigan,8" Minnesota, 81 New York,82 Oregon, Pennsylvania,
85 8687 8Texas, Virginia,86 Washington, West Virginia,88 the City of
ROOHB-06131-PA.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2002) (enacting a general
predatory lending law); Sub. H.B. 5073, Pub. Act 02-12, Gen. Assem., Reg.
Sess. (Conn. 2002), available at http://www.cga.state.ct.us/2002/act/Pa/
2002PA-00012-ROOHB-05073-PA.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2002) (affecting
the use of prepaid finance charges).
76. See Home Loan Protection Act of 2002, C.B. 14-515, Act 14-296,
Council of D.C., Reg. Sess. (D.C. 2002), available at
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/banking/PredLend_2002.htm (last visited Sept.
15, 2002). This act repealed the District of Columbia's stricter bill,
Protections from Predatory Lending and Mortgage Foreclosure Improvements
Act of 2000.
77. See S.B. 2262, Ch. 57, 2002 Leg. (Fla. 2002), available at
http://www.leg.state.fl.us/cgi-bin/viewpage.pl?Tab=session&Submenu = I
&FT=D&File=sb2262er.html&Directory=session/2002/Senate/bills/billtext/
html (last visited Sept. 15, 2002).
78. See H.B. 1361, Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2002), available at
http://www.legis.state.ga.us/Legis/200 1_02/sum/hb 1361 .htm (last visited Aug.
30, 2002).
79. See H.B. 649, Ch. 532, Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2002), available
at http://mlis.state.md.us/2002rs/billfile/HB0649.htm (last visited Sept. 15,
2002).
80. See H.B. 6121 91st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2002), available at
http://www.michiganlegislature.org/documents/mcl/pdf/mcl-act-660-of-
2002.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2003).
81. See S.B. 2988, Ch. 342, 2002 Leg., 82d Sess. (Minn. 2002), available at
http://www.revisor.leg.state.mn.us/cgi-bin/getbill.pl?number=SF2988&
session=ls82&version=latest&sessionnumber=O&session_year=2002 (last
visited Sept. 15, 2002).
82. See H.B. 11856, Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2002), available at
http://www.mbaa.org/stateupdate/2002/ny/al 1856_fin.pdf (last visited Nov.
12, 2002).
83. See H.B. 2764, 71st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2001), available at
http://www.leg.state.or.us/Olorlaws/0952.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2003).
84. See S.B. 377, Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2001), available at
http://www.legis.state.pa.us/WUO1/LI/BI/BT/2001/0/SBO377P1240.HTM (last
visited Feb. 27, 2003).
85. See S.B. 1581, Ch. 622, 77th Leg., Reg. Sess. available at
http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/tlo/legislationIbillstatus.htm (last visited Feb.
27, 2003).
86. See H.B. 2708, Ch. 510, Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2001), available
at http://legl .state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?01 1+ful+CHAP05 10 (last visited
Sept. 15, 2002).
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Cleveland, 89 and the City of Oakland.90 A rare example of anti-
predatory lending legislation that has a provision specifically
regarding the elderly is Ohio's.91 Ohio's enactment specifies that
lenders who fail to comply with its legislation can be fined and that
"If the person injured by the failure to comply is sixty-five years of
age or older, the superintendent may double the amount of the
fine."
92
When the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP)
drafted a Model Home Loan Protection Act to prevent predatory
lending, one might have supposed that the AARP would design
special protections for older homeowners. 93 Indeed, the model bill's
Introduction notes that predatory lenders often target the elderly, and
that older homeowners are more likely to have substantial equity in
their homes, which likely need repair.94 Enacting the provisions of
the AARP's model bill will "help to ensure that millions of older
Americans will be able to remain financially secure in their homes
87. See H.B. 1205, Ch. 81, 57th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2001), available at
http://www.leg.wa.gov/pub/billinfo/2001-02/House/1200-1224/1205__pl_
04092001 .txt
88. See H.B. 4379, Ch. 39, Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2002),
available at http://www.legis.state.wv.us/legishp.html (last visited Sept. 15,
2002).
89. See CLEVELAND, OHIO, ORDINANCE 737-02 (Apr. 23, 2002), available
at http://www.mbaa.org/state_update/2002/oh/cleveland-final.pdf (last visited
Sept. 2, 2002). For claims that Cleveland's ordinance is driving out lenders
see Panel Urged to Toughen Lending Law, CIN. POST, Aug. 28, 2002, at 12A,
2002 WL 25164410.
90. See OAKLAND, CAL., ORDINANCE 12361 (Oct. 2, 2001).
91. Given the pace of new predatory lending enactments on the federal,
state, and local level, it is difficult to attempt to track all such enactments, other
than through a constantly updated Web page.
92. See H.B. 386, Sec. 1349.34(F), 124th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio
2001-2002), available at ohioacts.avv.com/124/hb_386.html (last visited Feb.
27, 2003).
93. See AARP, Home Loan Protection Act. A Model State Statute (2001),
available at http://research.aarp.org/consume/d17346_loan.html (last visited
Sept. 25, 2002). This model statute was drafted by Mike Calhoun of the Self-
Help Credit Union and Margot Saunders, Elizabeth Renuart, and Mark Benson
of the National Consumer Law Center.
94. See id. at Introduction.
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and communities." 95 However, despite the interest of its sponsor and
the purpose stated in its Introduction, the AARP model bill does not
provide any special protections for elderly homeowners.96 If the
AARP model bill, like most enacted legislation, does not contain
special protections for the elderly, presumably good reasons must
explain this stark and nearly universal omission.
Instead of offering elders specific protections in their anti-
predatory lending legislation, some states have enacted separate laws
targeting fraud against the elderly, commonly by providing enhanced
remedies for elderly victims. For example, California enacted the
landmark Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act
(EADACPA), which "provides civil plaintiffs a private right of
action to recover enhanced remedies in cases where they can show
clear and convincing evidence of physical abuse, reckless neglect, or
fiduciary abuse." 97  In addition, the California Consumer Legal
Remedies Act (CLRA), which is designed to prevent acts of unfair
competition or unfair business practice, provides treble damages
when such behavior is directed toward the elderly.98  A senior
95. Id.
96. This comment is intended as an observation, not a criticism. There are
potential pitfalls to creating special protections for the elderly in general anti-
predatory lending legislation unless those protections are carefully constructed.
See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
97. Martin Ramey, Comment, Putting the Cart Before the Horse: The Need
to Re-Examine Damage Caps in California's Elder Abuse Act, 39 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 599, 603 (2002) (citations omitted).
98. See Consumers Legal Remedies Act, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1750-85
(West 1998 & Supp. 2002). California Civil Code section 3345 provides that a
trier of fact may impose a fine up to three times that provided by statute or,
where no statute provides a set sum, up to three times what would otherwise be
set based on one or more of the following factors:
(1) Whether the defendant knew or should have known that his or
her conduct was directed to one or more senior citizens or
disabled persons.
(2) Whether the defendant's conduct caused one or more senior
citizens or disabled persons to suffer: loss or encumbrance of a
primary residence.., or assets essential to the health or welfare
of the senior citizen or disabled person.
(3) Whether one or more senior citizens or disabled persons are
substantially more vulnerable than other members of the public
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consumer may also be awarded an additional sum of up to $5,000 if
he has suffered substantial physical, emotional, or economic
damages in certain instances. 99 Illinois' Financial Exploitation of the
Elderly and Disabled Act also provides for treble damages in
addition to attorneys' fees where a senior citizen, through threat or
deception, loses property. 00 Oregon provides similar protection,
though without treble damages.'(' While these statutes are crucial
weapons in the fight to protect elders from financial abuse, they are
not crafted to respond to the intricacy of lending law and do not
strike at all forms of predatory lending.'
0 2
In many instances, predatory lenders do not affirmatively
misrepresent their loans to their customers, but instead employ hard-
sell tactics and rely on a welter of impenetrable loan terms designed
to confuse unsophisticated borrowers and trick them into unwittingly
accepting over-priced loans. 10 3 Even when a predatory lender has
engaged in affirmative fraud, the borrower is often left with only a
to the defendant's conduct because of age, poor health or
infirmity, impaired understanding, restricted mobility, or
disability, and actually suffered substantial physical, emotional,
or economic damage resulting from the defendant's conduct.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3345 (West 1997).
99. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1780(b) (West 1998 & Supp. 2002) (providing
that a senior citizen may be awarded:
up to five thousand dollars ($5,000) where the trier of fact (1) finds
that the consumer has suffered substantial physical, emotional, or
economic damage resulting from the defendant's conduct, (2) makes
an affirmative finding in regard to one or more of the factors set forth
in subdivision (b) of Section 3345, and (3) finds that an additional
award is appropriate.).
100. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/16-1.3 (1993). For a discussion of
the Illinois statute, see Moskowitz, supra note 46, at 106, and Seymour
Moskowitz, New Remedies for Elder Abuse and Neglect, 12 PROB. & PROP. 52,
56 (Jan. 1998).
101. See OR. REV. STAT. § 124.100 (2001).
102. For a description of elder abuse statutes throughout the United States,
see Dessin, supra note 2, Carolyn L. Dessin, Financial Exploitation Statutes'
Impact on Domestic Relations Practice, 16 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 379
(2000), and Moskowitz, supra note 46.
103. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 11, at 1283.
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worthless claim, as most subprime lenders have declared bankruptcy
in recent years.l°4
Unscrupulous originators of loans typically sell them quickly on
the secondary market, leaving borrowers subject to purchasers who
claim holder in due course status, thus entitling purchasers to
freedom from claims of personal fraud asserted by borrowers.
10 5
Therefore, the states' elder protection laws may not protect
borrowers from the overreaching that lies at the heart of predatory
lending, as treble damages count for little if they cannot be collected.
Using enhanced remedies to punish elder abusers relies on a
system of enforcement that is not suited for many of the elderly.
Enforcing borrowers' rights requires litigating their claims, perhaps
years after the fact, and depends on testimony by the victims. Elder
victims of fraud are already often in declining health and may be
poorly equipped to testify or to prosecute a lawsuit to protect or
regain their home.l16 Seymour Moskowitz has noted that "[b]ecause
of the slow pace of litigation, many of the frail elderly do not survive
long enough for a lawsuit to come to judgment." 0 7  Not only is
litigation difficult for vulnerable elders, but they are also less likely
to seek protection by contacting community organizations that offer
such support.' 
08
VI. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN AUTONOMY AND PROTECTIONISM IN
SHIELDING ELDERS FROM PREDATORY LENDING
If elders are a favorite target of predatory lenders and stand the
most to lose when they fall victim to unscrupulous lenders, one
might well ask why the various statutes, regulations, and ordinances
designed to prevent predatory lending largely ignore the special need
104. See the description of the boom, bust, and bankruptcy cycle of
subprime lenders in Eggert, supra note 11, at 522.
105. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 11, at 1301.
106. See discussion of this point in Harkness, supra note 44, at 43-44.
107. Moskowitz, supra note 46, at 104.
108. Donna Harkness states that "by definition, the elderly most likely to be
victimized by predatory lenders are those individuals least able to organize and
take advantage of the technical support offered by organizations like
ACORN." Harkness, supra note 44, at 38.
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for protection of the elderly. Both the lending industry and some
advocates for the elderly might argue that providing special
protections for senior homeowners could either drive up the cost of
loans to that group or, by making it more difficult for them to obtain
a loan, deprive them to some extent of the freedom of borrowing
money. 109
One risk in attempting to protect the vulnerable elderly is falling
into "new ageism" l0or "compassionate ageism,""' which is an
excessive concern for the frailties and vulnerabilities of the elderly
that, in its zeal to protect their finances or physical health, neglects to
protect the freedom and autonomy of seniors. 12  The classic
criticism of this over-protectionism is the widely quoted statement of
Richard Kalish:
The message of the New Ageism seems to be that "we"
understand how badly you are being treated.., and that if
you adhere to our program, "we" will make your life
considerably better. You are poor, lonely, weak,
incompetent, ineffectual, and no longer terribly bright. You
109. For the lending industry's argument that protections designed to reduce
predatory lending will drive up the cost of credit or constrict the amount of
credit available to subprime borrowers, see Neil J. Morse, The Predatory
Lending Obstacle Course, MORTGAGE BANKING 52, Apr. 1, 2002, available at
2002 WL 11226626. But see Ernst et al., supra note 70, at 5 and
accompanying text (documenting that additional protections in North Carolina
have not driven up the cost of credit). According to one drafter of the AARP
model bill, one reason that the model bill omitted any special protections for
the elderly was the view that such protections could, by denying non-elderly
borrowers the additional protections, disadvantage other vulnerable
homeowners who somehow seem less sympathetic than the elderly. Telephone
conversation with Elizabeth Renuart, National Consumer Law Center (Oct. 11,
2002).
110. Richard A. Kalish, The New Ageism and the Failure Models: A
Polemic, 19 GERONTOLOGIST 398, 398 (1979).
111. Robert H. Binstock, The Aged as Scapegoat, 23 GERONTOLOGIST 136,
136 (1983). Binstock argues that, by presenting the aged as homogenous,
compassionate ageism actually nourishes what would seem to be its opposite,
the scapegoating of the elderly. See id. at 142.
112. For an excellent general discussion of "new ageism" and
"compassionate ageism" and the works of Kalish and Binstock, see Linda S.
Whitton, Ageism: Paternalism and Prejudice, 46 DEPAuL L. REv. 453, 468-69
(1997).
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are sick, in need of better housing and transportation and
nutrition, and "we"-the nonelderly and those elderly who
align themselves with us and work with us-are finally
going to turn our attention to you, the deserving elderly, and
relieve your suffering from ageism.'"
3
In protecting elders from financial abuse, it is difficult to
balance protecting their financial assets and income with protecting
their autonomy and freedom to make their own decisions
unencumbered by well-intentioned, but excessive, restrictions on
their ability to borrow, buy, sell, or give away their assets. For
example, one method to prevent predatory lending against elders
would be to require anyone over sixty-five years of age to have an
independent loan counselor review and approve any loan that the
elder might take out. Such a plan would likely meet furious
opposition, not only from the lending industry but also from senior
citizens groups who would protest that almost all of their members
are fully competent to make borrowing decisions and do not need to
be treated as children.
The great challenge in designing protections for the elderly lies
in heterogeneity of the senior population, with some showing a great
decline in their faculties and the majority showing little. 114 Dessin
notes, "[M]ost older adults function at the same level as earlier in
their lives. Although a significant number of older adults suffer from
some level of dementia, the percentages within the older population
suffering from dementia are fairly small."'1 15 Many senior citizens
are, despite or even because of their age and experience, able to
protect themselves from most fraud, and could resent the restriction
that protections might impose on them.
116
113. Kalish, supra note 110, at 398. Kalish argues that we should instead
"communicate to older persons that we have faith in their abilities, that we
recognize that they are capable of making decisions ... that we respect their
ownership of their own bodies and times and lives." Id. at 402.
114. See Linda S. Whitton, Re-examining Elder Law Practices: Reflections
on Ageism, 12 PROB. & PROP. 8, 10 (Jan. 1998).
115. Dessin, supra note 2, at 218.
116. Linda S. Whitton notes, "For the majority of persons, it is now believed
that age-related change in cognitive abilities is a very slow process, with only
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Two separate issues of autonomy intersect in the area of
predatory lending against the elderly. On the one hand, the predatory
nature of unscrupulous lending stems from the violation of the
consumers' autonomy that this lending represents. Generally,
capitalism operates relatively smoothly and efficiently when each
party in the exchange is sufficiently informed and competent to
determine for herself whether to participate in the exchange, and
each will normally only do so when the exchange benefits her or
others she wants to help. 117  It is assumed that each person
understands her own preferences better than anyone else could, and
so generally is in the best position to determine whether she will be
satisfied with the outcome of the exchange. 118 So long as each party
is sufficiently informed and capable, and voluntarily engages in an
exchange, that exchange should create a net benefit, even if an
uninvolved third party might question the wisdom of the
exchange. 119 At the heart of capitalism's efficiency then, is the
autonomous decision-making of each informed individual taking part
in the economy.
120
minimal declines of insignificant functional consequence." Whitton, supra
note 112, at 467.
117. Of course, this ideal is often not realized in consumer transactions, as
merchants and lenders often have greater information and other advantages
over consumers that sometimes lead consumers to accept transactions that do
not benefit them. See Bailey Kuklin, Self Paternalism in the Marketplace, 60
U. CiN. L. REV. 649, 651 (1992) (arguing that merchants have inherent
advantages, such as economies of scale, that render their exchanges with
consumers less than completely fair and efficient).
118. Feinberg describes Mill's articulation of this point as follows:
Mill insists that a given normal adult is much more likely to know his
own interest, talents, and natural dispositions (in the fulfillment of
which consists his good) than is any other party, and is much more
capable therefore of directing his own affairs to the end of his own
good than is a government official or a legislator.
JOEL FEINBERG, 3 THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO SELF
58 (1986).
119. To Milton Friedman, the test to determine whether a transaction
benefits both parties is whether the transaction is bilaterally voluntary and
informed. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 13 (1962).
120. See Lawrence Haworth, Autonomy and Utility, in THE INNER CITADEL:
ESSAYS ON INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY 155, 167 (John Christman ed., 1989)
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Predatory business behavior, however, subverts consumer
autonomy so that consumers accept exchanges that do not benefit
them or are worse than other available exchanges. This predation
relies on various means to undercut autonomy, such as: using
coercion or manipulation; concealing or misrepresenting
information needed to determine the value of the exchange; or
seeking victims who, because of physical or mental infirmities,
frailties that sometimes accompany age, 122  or addictive or
compulsive behavior, 123 are unable to assert or defend their own
autonomous, informed decision-making powers.
The design of anti-predatory lending laws appropriately
recognizes this subversion of autonomy, and these laws intervene to
protect borrowers who are about to agree to loans so expensive that
the borrowers would likely reject the loans were the borrowers truly
(stating "If our goal is to maximize satisfaction of autonomous preferences or
pleasures... then prima facie we should also strive to enhance the autonomy
of people generally....").
121. "Coercion and manipulation subject the will of one person to that of
another. That violates his independence and is inconsistent with his
autonomy." JOSEPH RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 378 (1986). Yochai
Benkler notes "Joseph Raz identified two primary forms of constraint that one
person can impose on another: coercion and manipulation. A person coerces
another when she reduces the other's range of options by force. A person
manipulates another when she interferes with the way that the other 'reaches
decisions, forms preferences, or adopts goals."' Yochai Benkler, Siren Songs
and Amish Children: Autonomy, Information, and Law, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 23,
38(2001).
122. For a discussion of the "profound consequences for autonomy" that
mental deterioration causes, see Caroline Dunn, The Effect of Ageing on
Autonomy, in AGEING, AUTONOMY AND RESOURCES 7, 15-16 (A. Harry Lesser
ed., 1999). Dunn notes the conditions more commonly afflicting the elderly
that can result in incompetence, such as Alzheimer's disease, stating, "None of
these issues relate solely to the elderly ... but it is also true to say that the
elderly are more susceptible by virtue of the incidence of chronic illness being
higher amongst the elderly.... ." Id. at 16.
123. See FEINBERG, supra note 118, at 166. Fallon also notes, "Helplessness
can take other forms as well. For example, a drug addict may be unable to
resist her compulsion." Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two Senses of Autonomy, 46
STAN. L. REV. 875, 888 (1994).
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free and informed. 124 A Florida assistant attorney general described
the fees of one notorious predatory lender as "just so excessively
high that it's hard for me to conceive of any way a consumer would
agree to that kind of loan if all the facts have been put before
them."
125
While predatory business behavior subverts autonomy, so too
may clumsily drawn or overly broad protections designed to protect
the elderly from those predations. Any regulation designed to
prevent elders from dealing with predatory businesses may have the
effect of restricting the freedom of those very elders, thereby
threatening their autonomy. 126 This presents the difficult choice of
which is a greater threat to the autonomy of seniors, predatory
businesses or overprotective governments.
VII. AUTONOMY: ITS DEFINITION AND ROLE
Any effort to protect autonomy and resolve difficult choices
regarding it must be based on an understanding of what autonomy is.
The word "autonomy" comes from the Greek roots for "self' and
"rule" or "law," and so concerns the individual's ability to govern
one's self.127 Alan Rosenbaum defines autonomy as "the range of
control the participants in a particular social situation have with
respect to each other over their own private actions and over the
exercise of their respective processes of decision-making, valuing,
124. Government intervention is appropriate to protect autonomy, some
argue, even if it results in the restriction of the autonomy of some. See infra
note 216 and accompanying text.
125. Diana B. Henriques & Lowell Bergman, Profiting From Fine Print
With Wall Street's Help, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2000, at A 1, C 13, available at
2000 WL 19064943.
126. Dessin notes:
The elderly victims are adults who previously had complete autonomy
in their financial dealings. Any proposed solution to the problem that
does not take this into account is seriously lacking. One of the most
fundamental rights in our legal system is the right to make our own
choices as long as we are competent.
Dessin, supra note 2, at 217.
127. FEINBERG, supra note 118, at 27.
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and willing."'128 Feinberg calls it "the realm of inviolable sanctuary
most of us sense in our own beings."'
129
Autonomy has recently been widely recognized as one of the
central values and organizing concepts in Western Civilization. 130 It
is called a "core value in American public and private law"'131 and is
said to be "nearly synonymous with human dignity, and an imminent
value in any system which purports to place proper emphasis on the
respect for persons as such."'132 While autonomy is an important
value, however, it is not the only one and often must be weighed
against other important values. 1
33
A. Autonomy and the Elderly
Autonomy is a particularly sensitive issue to seniors. Compared
to their juniors, elders are in much greater danger of losing their
freedom to chart their own way, either because of the illnesses and
weaknesses that sometimes accompany old age, or because of the
perhaps well-intentioned efforts of others to limit the activities of the
128. ALAN S. ROSENBAUM, COERCION AND AUTONOMY 107 (1986).
129. FEINBERG, supra note 118, at 27.
130. Raz notes that autonomy, the freedom of individuals to be "(part) author
of [one's] life," is "an ideal particularly suited to the conditions of the
industrial age and its aftermath with their fast changing technologies and free
movement of labour." RAz, supra note 121, at 369. But see PAUL BARRY
CLARK, AUTONOMY UNBOUND 71-73 (1999) (discussing an Ancient Egyptian
text, approximately 4000 years old, which constitutes an inner dialogue by a
young man contemplating suicide as an escape from a life he finds
meaningless). Clark concludes that, even in the "theocratic society" of Ancient
Egypt and at least 3500 years before significant discussion of autonomy began,
the author of the ancient text "is indeed an individual in significant respects
and an [sic] also an autonomous individual in significant respects." Id. at 73.
131. David A.J. Richards, Autonomy in Law, in THE INNER CITADEL:
ESSAYS ON INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY 246 (John Christman ed., 1989).
132. THOMAS MAY, AUTONOMY, AUTHORITY AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY
13 (Francisco J. Laporta et al. eds., 1998).
133. Dworkin notes, "Autonomy is important, but so is the capacity for
sympathetic identification with others ... or the virtue of integrity. Similarly,
although it is important to respect the autonomy of others, it is also important
to respect their welfare, or their liberty, or their rationality." GERALD
DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 19 (Sydney Shoemaker
et al. eds., 1988).
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elderly.' 34 Elders may have to struggle to preserve their ability to
make their own decisions even when faced with a life seemingly
devoid of the opportunity to do so, if, for example, they live in a
nursing home, with few friends or relations still alive, and with
deteriorating health. 135  Autonomy is particularly important to
seniors, not only because they are in greater danger of losing it, but
also because their level of autonomy is an important predictor of
their subjective well-being and successful aging. 136  The modem
conception of autonomy has forced a reevaluation of many areas of
law particularly affecting the elderly, such as the doctrine of
134. See Daniel Thursz, Introduction, in EMPOWERING OLDER PEOPLE: AN
INTERNATIONAL APPROACH, at xi (Daniel Thursz et al. eds., 1995). In
discussing the fight of the elderly to preserve their own autonomy, Thursz
writes: "In order to live out their lives as they wish, they have to struggle
against both popular and professional biases. Often, these barriers to self-
determination are created by well-meaning individuals, be they children,
relatives, or social workers." Id.
135. See CHARLES W. LIDZ ET AL., THE EROSION OF AUTONOMY IN LONG-
TERM CARE 15 (1992) (noting that such a patient "may only plan for the next
few weeks as opposed to a younger person who has at least some plans for
years ahead. However, that does not limit the importance of the consistency of
her action with such longer-term goals.").
136. See P.S. Fry, The Unique Contribution of Key Existential Factors to the
Prediction of Psychological Well-Being of Older Adults Following Spousal
Loss, GERONTOLOGIST 6981 (2001), available at 2001 WL 16568538 (citing
C.K. HOLOHAN & R. R. SEARS, THE GIFTED GROUP IN LATER MATURITY
(1995); J.S. Levin & L.M. Chatters, Religion, Health and Psychological Well-
Being in Older Adults, 10 J. AGING & HEALTH 504, 531 (1998)).
LASHED TO THE MAST
informed consent in medicine, 137 advanced care directives, 138 and
end of life issues such as physician-assisted suicides.
139
Discussing autonomy, however, is complicated by the challenge
of pinning down its exact meaning. Joel Feinberg has noted that at
least four different concepts are tied up in the common understanding
of autonomy. 1
40
The specific situation I address, that of an elder who needs,
wants, or can be coerced to take out a loan, is a complicated one in
terms of issues of autonomy. 14  One might argue that allowing an
elder to be free to deal with lenders, even at the risk of being
defrauded, increases her autonomy because it allows her to make her
own financial decisions. At the same time, dealing with an
unscrupulous lender could cause a quick and drastic diminution of
137. See id.; see also LIDZ ET AL., supra note 135, at 3-4 (1992) (noting that
until the 1960s, "the dominant (and perhaps only) values in discussions of
health care ethics were beneficence and nonmaleficence" but since then the
new value of patient autonomy has become a central element of these
discussions).
138. See Leslie Pickering Francis, Decisionmaking at the End of Life:
Patients With Alzheimer's or Other Dementias, 35 GA. L. REV. 539, 551-53
(2001) (discussing whether the autonomy of patients is fostered by advanced
care directives or other instruments designed to provide "[w]hat Ronald
Dworkin calls 'precedent autonomy"'-allowing a person when competent to
record her directives to be followed when she is no longer competent).
139. For a discussion of autonomy and end of life issues see Gavin Fairbaim,
Ending Lives: Age, Autonomy and the Quality of Life, in AGEING, AUTONOMY
AND RESOURCES 93-103 (A. Harry Lesser ed., 1999).
140. Feinberg states:
It can refer either to the capacity to govern oneself, which of course is
a matter of degree; or to the actual condition of self-government and
its associated virtues; or to an ideal of character derived from that
conception; or (on the analogy to a political state) to the sovereign
authority to govern oneself, which is absolute within one's own moral
boundaries (one's "territory," "realm," "sphere," or "domain").
FEINBERG, supra note 118, at 28.
141. John Kultgen notes, "Any reasonable ban on parentalism based on
respect for autonomy must be replete with exceptions because the forms of
autonomy vary in degree and importance and some deserve much more respect
than others." JOHN KULTGEN, AUTONOMY AND INTERVENTION: PARENTALISM
IN THE CARING LIFE 89 (1995).
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the senior's autonomy if, as a result, she loses her home through
foreclosure.
142
B. Autonomy and Orders of Desires
When a person is buffeted by influences, threats, pleas, and
promises from all sides, from parents, churches, friends,
governments, and businesses, it is difficult to determine whether that
person's decisions were made autonomously or were merely the
product of one or more outside influences. 143 One school of thought
on describing and defining autonomy, led by Harry G. Frankfurt and
Gerald Dworkin, argues that the key to autonomy is understanding
how people are able to choose among their various desires,
preferences, and hopes and, by choosing which ones they seek to
embrace, "define their nature, give meaning and coherence to their
lives, and take responsibility for the kind of person they are."'
144
Authenticity is the key to autonomy-autonomous decisions are
those that a person has made in a more considered way than
decisions made based on mere desire or command. Because they are
more authentic and considered, autonomous decisions reflect the
individual's central conception of self.1
45
142. See supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text (discussing disastrous
effects foreclosure has on the autonomy of an elderly homeowner).
143. Fallon notes, "To the extent that someone is coerced or manipulated,
she is not autonomous" but admits "'coercion' and 'manipulation' are vague
and relative concepts." Fallon, supra note 123, at 889.
144. DWORKIN, supranote 133, at 19.
145. May argues "that Dworkin has the relationship between autonomy and
identification reversed," and that "[i]t is not that autonomous behavior is that
behavior we identify with, it is that those behaviors we identify with are
autonomous behaviors." MAY, supra note 132, at 14. However, this criticism
ignores Dworkin's abandonment of identification as the key to autonomy and
Dworkin's new view that reflection and the ability to choose among first-order
desires by considering second-order volitions is the crux of autonomy. See
infra notes 152-157 and accompanying text.
Furthermore, because Dworkin's argument signifies that autonomy and
identification are inextricably linked-that autonomy requires identification-
arguing that the reverse of Dworkin's statement is also true does not seem to
substantially weaken Dworkin's argument.
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Frankfurt distinguishes between first-order desires and second-
order desires.146 First-order desires are the direct wants, needs, and
urges a person may have, such as the desire to eat or go swimming,
however primal, sophisticated, desirable, or venal those urges might
be. 147 Second-order desires on the other hand are, in effect, wanting
to want something.14 8 For example, if a person wished that he cared
more about schoolwork, that yearning to care more is a second-order
desire. Frankfurt distinguishes between merely wanting to have a
certain desire and wanting a certain desire to be the one acted on, to
be the person's will, to be the first-order desire a person wants to be
effective. 149  In this way, Frankfurt differentiates between a mere
whim that one might desire something, and an authentic yearning to
want something.'
50
146. See Harry G. Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a
Person, 68 J. PHIL. 5, 8-9 (1971); see also ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL
EXPLANATIONS 355 (1981) (stating that "[p]eople have higher order wants
about what wants and desires to have, what they are to be like."); Gordon C.
Winston, The Reasons for Being of Two Minds: A Comment on Schelling's
"Enforcing Rules on Oneself', I J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 375, 377 (1985)
("People have 'metarankings' of their preferences, in Amartya Sen's phrase;
we have preferences about our preferences.") (emphasis omitted) (citing
Amartya Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of
Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317 (1977)).
147. See Frankfurt, supra note 146, at 8.
148. Irving Thalberg attacks the theoretical structure of first- and second-
order desires by raising the possibility of infinite regress, questioning that if
there are second-order volitions, why are there not third- and fourth-order
volitions, such as wanting to feel that you wanted to feel that you wanted to be
something different, so to speak. See Irving Thalberg, Hierarchical Analyses
of Unfree Action, in THE INNER CITADEL: ESSAYS ON INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY
123, 130 (John Christman ed., 1989). Gerald Dworkin responds, "As a matter
of contingent fact human beings either do not, or perhaps cannot, carry on such
iteration at such great length." DWORKIN, supra note 133, at 19. Nozick also
discounts the necessity of an infinite regress, stating that, "Instead of imagining
an infinite number of levels, we can imagine that we reach a desire that desires
some desire at the next lowest level and also self-subsumptively desires itself."
NOZICK, supra note 146, at 357.
149. See Frankfurt, supra note 146, at 10.
150. Dworkin and Frankfurt's description of first- and second-order desires
is akin to Feinberg's conception of an inner core and an outer core of self, with
the inner core being essential for self-control, which Feinberg identifies as an
important aspect of autonomy. Feinberg states:
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These latter types of second-order volitions are what Frankfurt
insists makes a person human, namely the ability to pick and choose
among his desires and decide which desires that he wants to be acted
on and embraced as elemental to himself.151  By comparison, a
complete wanton would be one who acts heedlessly, based on
whichever first-order desire is currently strongest without any
attempt to decide which desire is most desirable. 15.2
The inner core self is the "ruling part" with which we most intimately
identify. The self outside the inner core ... includes the body, the
passions, and particular desires, appetites, and emotions. The inner
core is usually identified with "Reason," but if reason is to have any
opportunity to do its job ... we must also attribute to it the materials it
works with-one's most deeply entrenched first principles, ideals,
goals, and values.
FEINBERG, supra note 118, at 41.
151. Elster argues that, rather than being essential to being a person,
second-order desires may "simply reflect weakness of will," since they might
be the result of being unable to follow one's better judgment. JON ELSTER,
ULYSSES UNBOUND 21 (2000). However, without second-order processes to
choose among first-order desires, one would have great difficulty regulating
those first-order desires, which seems to be itself a case of weakness of will.
Thalberg has argued, however, that autonomy cannot be merely a product of
second-order volitions, or identification with second-order volitions, because a
person could have second-order volitions, yet fail to identify with them, and
instead identify with his first-order desires. See Thalberg, supra note 148, at
130. Thalberg states, "[W]hy grant that a second-order attitude must always be
more genuinely his, more representative of what he genuinely wants, than
those you run into at ground level?" Id.; see also Gary Watson, Free Agency,
in THE INNER CITADEL: ESSAYS ON INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY 109, 119 (John
Christman ed., 1989) (speculating that "'identification and commitment"'
occur more "generally to courses of action, that is, [they] are first-order
[desires].").
If the failure to identify with certain second-order volitions or the decision
to identify with first-order volitions is a conscious, reflective choice, however,
then that choice is itself arguably to some extent a second-order process, as it
indicates a preference for a first-order volition and demonstrates the autonomy
of the chooser, but neither the possible failure to identify with second-order
volitions nor the possibility of identifying with first-order desires disprove the
existence of those second-order volitions or removes them from the process of
determining autonomy.
152. See Frankfurt, supra note 146, at 11. Mele argues, however, that a
person may exhibit what appears to be autonomous self-control not because of
a victorious second-order desire, but rather because the dominant first-order
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Dworkin moves away from Frankfurt and his initial view by
deciding that, while identification with certain desires is important to
autonomy, it is not the absolute crux of autonomy. 53  Earlier,
Dworkin almost solely focused on the process of identification with
certain desires as the determining factor of autonomy. 1
54
While he still considers this identification an important aspect of
autonomy, Dworkin has come to view reflection and the capacity to
attempt to change first-order desires, rather than identification, as the
critical steps in determining whether an individual's behavior is
autonomous. He concludes that "autonomy is conceived of as a
second-order capacity of persons to reflect critically upon their first-
order preferences, desires, wishes, and so forth and the capacity to
accept or attempt to change these in light of higher-order preferences
and values."' 155
desire produces such restraint. See ALFRED R. MELE, AUTONOMOUS AGENTS:
FROM SELF-CONTROL TO AUTONoMY 68 (1995) (stating "[I]t seems plain,
[that] an agent may exhibit a modicum of self-control and behave continently
in the absence of any relevant second-order desire."). However, the mere
possibility that someone might from time to time exhibit restraint based on
first-, rather than second-order desires does not seem to eliminate the
possibility of second-order desires or greatly reduce their role in an
individual's self-governance.
153. Dworkin states that "[i]t is not the identification or lack of identification
that is crucial to being autonomous, but the capacity to raise the question of
whether I will identify with or reject the reasons for which I now act."
DWORKIN, supra note 133, at 15.
154. See Gerald Dworkin, Autonomy and Behavior Control, HASTINGS
CENTER REP. (Feb. 1976) ("It is the attitude a person takes toward the
influences motivating him which determines whether or not they are to be
considered 'his'. Does he identify with them, assimilate them to himself, view
himself as the kind of person who wishes to be motivated in these particular
ways?").
155. DWORKIN, supra note 133, at 20. Dworkin finishes the thought by
stating, "By exercising such a capacity, persons define their nature, give
meaning and coherence to their lives, and take responsibility for the kind of
person they are." Id. Dworkin acknowledges that his conception might be
criticized as requiring such a high level of critical thinking that it would be
mainly "professors of philosophy who exercise autonomy .... " Id. at 17.
Dworkin responds by noting that "a farmer living in an isolated rural
community, with a minimal education, may without being aware of it be
conducting his life in ways which indicate that he has shaped and molded his
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Someone who, after critical reflection, decides to become a
heroin addict and revels in the illicit sub-bohemian life that
accompanies the addiction would be choosing the addiction
autonomously, even if he would have great difficulty overcoming the
addiction were he to try. 156 On the other hand, someone who is
equally addicted, but wishes, hopes, and prays to be free from the
addiction, does not choose to take heroin autonomously if he does so
because of the addiction and not because of a second-order
volition. 157
Michael Bratman has recently emphasized the importance of
time and planning in autonomy. Bratman locates an individual's
ability to endorse a desire reflectively, and hence autonomously, in
her creation of self-governing policies, which are higher-order plans
about how to treat desires, rejecting them or endorsing them, over
time."'
life according to reflective procedures." Id. Conversely, philosophy
professors have been known to be prisoners of their desires on occasion.
156. For a critique of the moral neutralism of the Frankfurt/Dworkin
conception of autonomy, see Henry S. Richardson, Autonomy's Many Moral
Normative Presuppositions, 38(3) AM. PHIL. Q. 287 (2001). Richardson
concludes that "there is systematic reason to believe that analyses of rational
autonomy that attempt to remain neutral as to moral or evaluative content will
necessarily fail... [E]ven the paradigm cases to which these analyses appeal
are subject to being converted to counterexamples by varying their moral and
evaluative content." Id. at 299.
157. Frankfurt compares the unwilling addict, who may continue to take
drugs while identifying with the desire to be free of drugs, with the wanton
addict, who does not care whether his craving for drugs or his aversion to the
harm caused by drugs proves to be the dominant desire. See Frankfurt, supra
note 146, at 13.
158. See Michael E. Bratman, Reflection, Planning and Temporally
Extended Agency, 109(1) PHIL. REV. 35, 48-51 (2000). Bratman states:
[S]uch [self-governing] policies-unlike intentions and plans that
concern only particular occasions-are explicitly concerned with the
functioning of relevant desires generally in one's temporally extended
life.... This suggests that the agent's reflective endorsement or
rejection of a desire can be to a significant extent constituted by ways
in which her self-governing desires are committed to treating that
desire over time. She endorses or rejects a desire, roughly, when
relevant self-governing policies endorse or reject relevant functioning
of the desire.
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Applying this framework of first-order and second-order desires
to the field of consumer transactions in general and predatory lending
in particular, we see that an elderly borrower may have first-order
desires to obtain a loan, or to put a new roof on her house, or to pay
off her credit card bills, or any other of the numerous reasons
homeowners find themselves talking to lenders. 159 However, she
will likely have many other first-order desires implicated in her
decision whether or not to borrow money or what terms she should
accept. She will likely want to make certain that she will be able to
make her house payments and will not lose her home to foreclosure.
Also, she will likely want not to be overcharged for the loan and not
to pay higher interest rates or fees than she needs to, given her credit
rating. She will probably want to deal with a lender who is
trustworthy, who gives her complete and accurate information about
the loan, and who does not try to ressure her into taking a loan that
would not be appropriate for her. I60
From this analysis, we can see that the autonomy of the
homeowner is not determined solely or even primarily by whether or
not she is free to enter into any loan she may desire. Instead, under
the Frankfurt/Dworkin view, her autonomy is determined by how
well she is able to pick among her first-order desires, to reflect on her
choice, and by how authentic her decision among those first-order
desires may be.' 6 1 Naturally, her desires are easiest to reconcile if
her higher order volitions endorse her first-order desires.' 62 If she
Id. at48.
159. For examples of why homeowners decide to take out loans or refinance,
see Saunders & National Consumer Law Center, supra note 11, at 116-20.
160. For a description of the homeowner's difficulty in determining whether
a lender is dishonest, see Eggert, supra note 11, at 534-52.
161. Thomas C. Schelling counsels against putting too much stock in
"authenticity" in deciding which of our preferences or selves should hold
sway, stating, "Should we look for the authentic self?... The question, which
is the authentic one, may define the problem wrong. Both selves can be
authentic." Thomas C. Schelling, Self-Command in Practice, in Policy, and in
a Theory of Rational Choice, AM. ECON. REv. 1, 9 (May 1984) (separately
paginated Papers and Proceedings issue).
162. See NOZICK, supra note 146, at 357 ("The most harmony would be
exhibited if all desires above the first level endorsed the first level
desires ... ").
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can make a decision that is true to her higher-order desires, one that
is an authentic declaration of herself, then she has made the decision
autonomously. If she signs a loan as the result of a high-pressure
sales pitch by an unscrupulous lender without understanding the
terms or effects of the loan or having time to think about them,
however, then even though she was free not to sign the loan, her
decision was not a truly autonomous one.1 63  Her autonomy was
diminished by her ignorance and lack of time to deliberate, and also
by the manipulative influence of the lender. 1
64
If we hold that autonomy has intrinsic value, then to improve the
lives of the elderly, we should try to increase their autonomy.
165
However, as Raz points out, one cannot force another person to be
more autonomous. 16 6 Instead, the most that can be done is "by and
large confined to securing the background conditions which enable a
person to be autonomous."'167 Still, the law has a clear role to play in
individual autonomy, as it can (a) affect the number of options a
person has by restricting or mandating their availability, (b) alter, to
some extent, a person's ability to form preferences by, for example,
banning or requiring some forms of literature or communication, and
163. "The more fully one understands one's action, the alternatives, and their
consequences, and makes a decision based on this information, the more
autonomous the action is." LIDZ ET AL., supra note 135, at 10.
164. Lidz, Fischer, and Arnold distinguish between coercive threats, which
"present[] a threat of unwanted and unavoidable harm that a person will be
unable to resist," with manipulative influences, which do not employ coercive
threats, but still attempt to change the nature or number of choices available to
the chooser or to alter the chooser's perception of the nature or quality of the
choices. Id. at 8-9.
165. See RAZ, supra note 121, at 407 ("Since autonomy is morally valuable,
there is reason for everyone to make himself and everyone else autonomous.").
Lidz, Fischer, and Arnold state, "There is an intrinsic good to be gained from
allowing an individual to direct her own life." LIDZ ET AL., supra note 135, at
5. It is important to separate the value of autonomy from the value of merely
having more choices. See discussion of the gains to autonomy that may come
from limiting choices at notes 174-177 and accompanying text.
166. See RAZ, supra note 121, at 407. Raz also notes, "[I]t is the special
character of autonomy that one cannot make another person autonomous. One
can bring the horse to water but one cannot make it drink." Id.
167. Id.
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(c) give or deny one set of persons power to control the actions of
another set of persons.
168
C. Maximizing Overall Autonomy by Specific Limitations on
Autonomy
Deciding what changes to make to maximize elders' autonomy
is difficult in that, just as autonomy resists easy definition, it also
resists easy quantification. 169 Increasing autonomy is not merely a
matter of removing restraints, for even unrestrained, a person may
have so few options that she has no real choice in what to do. 170 Nor
does merely providing more options provide more autonomy, since
the individual given the options may effectively have no way to
analyze them or determine which is preferable. To provide the
greatest possibility of autonomy, we would need to provide a rich
array of options as well as work to ensure that the chooser has the
capacity to rate and compare those options.171 As Kultgen notes:
168. See Benkler, supra note 121, at 39-40.
169. Kultgen states:
No one would be so foolish as to claim that quanta of autonomy can
be measured and aggregates summed, but gross differences can be
discriminated.... Despite these limitations, one who intervenes in the
life of another can often judge well enough whether his action will
enhance her autonomy in a significant way by providing her more
resources, reinforcing her self-control, helping her sort out her values,
providing her information, etc.
KULTGEN, supra note 141, at 90.
170. See RAZ, supra note 121, at 407-08. Raz lists as the ways to increase
the autonomy of another "refrain[ing] from coercing or manipulating him,"
helping to "creat[e] the inner capacities required for the conduct of an
autonomous life," and creating "an adequate range of options for him to choose
from." Id.
171. Bruce Waller notes:
Determining whether the choice is naturally autonomous requires
study of the setting in which the choice is made, with focus on two
key questions: are there genuine alternatives available and does the
individual possess what is needed to effectively examine those
alternatives (human needs include knowledge, intelligence, and
freedom from obsession or irrational fear... ).
BRUCE N. WALLER, THE NATURAL SELECTION OF AUTONOMY 14 (1998).
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The first thing to observe is that autonomy is variable along
several dimensions: it involves resources, opportunities to
act, and the cost of each act, along with rationality in the
form of an ordered set of preferences, sound beliefs, logical
powers of inference, and self-control. Each of these may be
present in any number of quantities or degrees. 172
In the area of lending, however, the ability of borrowers to
choose among lenders is often hindered rather than aided by a
multiplicity of options. Take, as an example, an elder homeowner
who has decided to borrow $20,000 for home improvements. She
would like to compare the different lenders' proposals to determine
which of them are best suited to her. Most likely, she will focus on
those terms that she believes concern her most: the amount of her
payment and the term of her loan. Lenders have many other possible
options that they can present to her, such as whether she has a
prepayment penalty, whether she purchases single premium credit
insurance, whether her interest rate and payment amount will be
adjusted upward after a low introductory period, or whether she pays
significant up-front fees in return for a putatively lower interest rate.
By using a barrage of such options and by failing to explain them or
their effects, unscrupulous lenders can confuse a borrower,
preventing a borrower from being able to determine whether the loan
is appropriate for the borrower and how well it compares to other
loans she might obtain.
173
In other words, the borrower would be freer effectively to
choose among several loans if each lender were forced to provide
fewer options-if the subprime market functioned much more like
172. KULTGEN, supra note 141, at 90.
173. Engel and McCoy state:
In short, the borrowers targeted by predatory lenders end up
committing to complex mortgages with probabilistic terms, while
prime borrowers, who are generally more sophisticated, can take
advantage of straightforward, fixed-rate mortgages without any
penalty provisions or contingent price terms. In the end, the victims of
predatory lenders sign documents without having a clear sense of the
terms of the contracts, how much they borrowed, what they purchased,
the terms of repayment, or the risks they assumed.
Engel & McCoy, supra note 11, at 1286.
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the prime market and all of the loans available to borrowers were
fairly similar, with only a handful of differing terms.174 This
similarity makes comparing several loans easier, as the borrower
need only compare the few different terms. If borrowers could
choose how many choices they would have, many would likely
prefer to have fewer variables among loans, making the decision-
making process easier, with less risk of error and less time and effort
in making the decision. 175 These decisions of how many and which
choices to have are called "metachoices."'
' 76
Therefore, there are at least two ways in which restricting the
choices or freedom available to borrowers may, counter-intuitively,
increase their autonomy. First, an elder who is not free to enter into
a predatory loan will actually be, in the end, more autonomous if she
can thereby avoid losing her home or a significant portion of its
equity. Second, if a borrower can more effectively rate loan options
because more of the loan terms are standard among all of the loans
and fewer of the terms vary between the loans, then the borrower is
more in control of the loan process, has greater freedom to make
good decisions concerning the loans, and is more independent of the
influence of mortgage brokers. 1
77
174. See id. at 1284 ("In contrast to prime-mortgage lenders, predatory
lenders rarely make plain-vanilla, fixed-rate loans with easily understood
payment terms.").
175. Dworkin notes that "[i]n addition to the costs of acquiring information,
there are the costs in time and effort of making the choice" as well as the
"psychic costs" of agonizing over whether the decision was the correct one.
DWORKIN, supra note 133, at 66-67.
176. Id. at 155 (citing Robert Nozick, Coercion, in 4 PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS
AND SOCIETY 10 1-36 (Peter Laslett et al. eds., 4th ed. 1972)).
177. Michael Blake notes the possibility that having excess options may
decrease one's autonomy, stating that, "it seems plausible that past a certain
point, having further options may actually reduce our ability to make sense of
and organize our lives in accordance with our plans." Michael Blake,
Distributive Justice, State Coercion, and Autonomy, 30(3) PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
257, 269 (2002).
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D. Determining When to Honor and Enforce Self-Limitations of
Autonomy
While it seems counter-intuitive that restricting one's own
autonomy in specific ways can at times increase one's overall
autonomy, such an idea has been widely accepted. 178 On this point
Raz notes, "providing, preserving or protecting bad options does not
enable one to enjoy valuable autonomy."1 79 Gerald Dworkin adds:
These are cases where it is rational for individuals to reject
the possibility of making certain choices on the grounds
that if the choices were available they would be tempted to
make them and they recognize, in advance, that making
such choices would be harmful in terms of their long-range
interests. 1
8 0
The ability to self-limit one's own autonomy has been legally
recognized as well. 18 1 For example, some states permit voluntary
conservatorships, even where the proposed conservatee is competent,
but still desires someone else to have control over his estate.' 82 More
controversial are proposals for "Ulysses directives" or "Ulysses
contracts," which would allow someone with a recurring mental
ailment to determine, when they are fully competent, what mental
178. For a laundry list of various criticisms of self-limitation of autonomy, as
well as a response to each criticism, see Kuklin, supra note 117, at 661-71.
179. RAZ, supra note 121, at 412.
180. DWORKIN, supra note 133, at 76.
181. I refer to this effort to restrict one's options as "self-limitation of
autonomy" though I recognize that such self-limitation of autonomy often
requires the actions of a third party for enforcement. Self-limitation of
autonomy has also been termed "self-paternalism" and "precommitment."
Kuklin, supra note 117, at 654 n.6. It is similar to "precedent autonomy,"
which Ronald Dworkin uses to describe instances where a competent person
attempts to choose that which will be binding when she becomes incompetent.
Francis, supra note 138.
182. For example, Florida law provides:
Without adjudication of incapacity, the court shall appoint a guardian
of the property of a resident or nonresident person who, though
mentally competent, is incapable of the care, custody, and
management of his or her estate by reason of age or physical infirmity
and who has voluntarily petitioned for the appointment.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.341 (West 2002).
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health treatment they would receive at a later date, including
commitment, when their ailment begins to flare up. 183  These
advance directives are controversial because they could be used to
overrule the later wishes of the signer even if the signer is technically
competent. 
1 84
This controversy over Ulysses contracts indicates the potential
danger in self-limitation of autonomy: that it may be taken too far.
For example, few would argue that people should be allowed to sell
themselves into slavery, though it is challenging to set forth a
straightforward rationale for banning such a possibility that relies
solely on the grounds of autonomy. Nozick goes so far as to argue
that a person selling himself into slavery would still be "exercising
that self-choosing nature, and so, in virtue of that choice, [he] would
be (at the fundamental level) a self-chooser."'
185
Dworkin responds to Nozick's hypothetical by constructing a
test of whether we should enforce an individual's self-limitation of
autonomy even when that same individual might later recant.
Dworkin acknowledges that he cannot argue against self-imposed
slavery solely on the grounds of autonomy, but rather rejects the
possibility for two separate reasons: (1) safety concerns, based on
the fear that the would-be self-seller would miscalculate the benefits
and costs of slavery and (2) the fact that "[m]ost of us do not want to
183. Elizabeth M. Gallegher, Advance Directives for Psychiatric Care: A
Theoretical and Practical Overview for Legal Professionals, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL'Y & L. 746, 780-81 (1998) (discussing Ulysses clauses and contracts and
suggesting that, while the theoretical hurdles may be overcome, the practical
problems in enforcing these documents are daunting).
184. For example, Rebecca Dresser argues that too often the voluntary
commitment contract would become an instrument of coercion, poorly
explained to patients who would be too eager to please their doctors. See
Rebecca S. Dresser, Ulysses and The Psychiatrists: A Legal And Policy
Analysis of the Voluntary Commitment Contract, 16 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
777, 836-41 (1982). Winick proposes that this flaw could be ameliorated by
providing revocation power through a judicial or administrative hearing. See
Bruce J. Winick, Advance Directive Instruments For Those With Mental
Illness, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 57, 87 (1996).
185. NOZICK, supra note 146, at 355. For a discussion of Nozick's views
see John B. Attanasio, The Principle of Aggregate Autonomy and the
Calabresian Approach to Products Liability, 74 VA. L. REV. 677, 681 (1988).
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live in a society in which, for example, we are legally obligated to
return runaway slaves to their owners."
1 86
Feinberg also proposes a test to determine when self-limitations
of autonomy should be held binding. First, he asks, "which request,
that of the early self to bind the later, or that of the later self for a
release, is closer to being a genuinely voluntary one, or one that
reflects the settled disposition of the chooser as an enduring self over
time." 187 It would be an easy decision to support the self-limitation
of autonomy where "the later self s contrary 'choice' is the result of
coercion or fraud, and hence is not wholly voluntary."' 188 Feinberg
gives as an example someone with a drinking problem who asks his
host to limit him to two drinks at a party, concluding that "when my
compulsive, excited, abandoned future self renounces my earlier
request, the party host should think of the earlier request as the
controlling one." 89
To determine which version of the self-limiter's choice-the
earlier decision to limit autonomy or the later decision to revoke that
limitation-is closer to being more authentic and voluntary, the
relative quality of the choice should be examined. Factors to
consider include which decision was made with greater competency,
more information, and greater freedom from manipulation,
coercion, 190 or fraud, as well as which shows a more "resolute
intention" to make the decision.
191
186. DWORKIN, supra note 133, at 128-29.
187. FEINBERG, supra note 118, at 82.
188. Id. at 82-83.
189. Id. at 82.
190. See Thomas C. Schelling, Enforcing Rules on Oneself, I J.L. ECON &
ORG. 357, 360-61 (1985) (noting that "people may be coerced into severe
'voluntary' restrictions on their own behavior," but that more dangerous than
the rules people may impose on themselves are the "long-term or permanent
technologies and sanctions and privations and disablements that people might
choose to incur.").
191. James W. Nickel, Autonomy and Procedural Independence 2, 10-12
(May 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles
Law Review) (setting forth the characteristics of a decision to submit to
subordination that does not threaten the autonomy of the decider. Nickel
argues that the procedural aspects of the decision, such as the presence of a
method of reviewing the decision and escaping from the submission to
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Choosing which request to honor is often difficult, as it may be
hard to decide which intention is more trustworthy or indicative of
one's central purpose, if one reliably has such a thing. 192 Schelling
notes, "Sometimes, but not always, it is easy to know which is Jekyll
and which is Hyde."'
193
One could, following Parfit, attempt to separate one's identity
into various strands, such as a present self and various future selves,
with the central relation between them being not a specific unitary
self, but rather the degree of "psychological connectedness and
continuity."'1 94 If we, at least theoretically, split the self this way,
then the self-limitation of autonomy becomes, to a significant extant,
a method for the present self to bind the future self, or for the long-
term planning self to bind the self desiring immediate gratification. 
195
subordination, determine whether the submission to subordination threatens the
autonomy of the decider.).
192. Not only may it be difficult to decide which choice is more authentic,
there may be authenticity and resoluteness of purpose in the making of both
choices. Schelling notes:
Both selves can be authentic .... That both selves are authentic does
not eliminate the issue. We must still decide which request to grant.
But if both selves deserve recognition, the issue is distributive, not one
of identification... . In the absence of certainty about which self is
authentic, we have something like the distributive issue of dealing
fairly with two selves that have opposite needs.
Thomas C. Schelling, Ethics, Law, and the Exercise of Self-Command, in 4
THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 75 (Sterling M. McMurrin ed.,
1983).
193. THOMAS C. SCHELLING, CHOICE AND CONSEQUENCE 61 (1984). As an
example, Schelling notes the difficulty of judging someone who impulsively
gives his own overcoat to a freezing drunkard. See id. Elsewhere, Schelling
framed the problem by stating, "How do we tell-how do you tell-if this is
the moment of truth or the moment of derangement?" Thomas C. Schelling,
The Intimate Contest for Self-Command, 60 PUB. INT. 94, 104 (1980).
194. DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 313 (1984). Elster notes that
discounting of time preferences can be separated into two forms, the first being
the "absolute priority of the present," so that effect of any action on all future
selves, however near or distant, is less important than its current effect on the
present self. The second form of discounting notes that even among future
selves, there is some decay of priority of importance from the near future to the
distant future. JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS 71 (1979).
195. Schelling states:
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A policy privileging the present or long-term self over the future
or immediate gratification self could be criticized as paternalistic, or
as putting a thumb on the scale of authenticity. 96 However, failing
to intervene, or at least to provide the present self or long-term
planning self effective methods to have their will have an effect
could give the future self or immediate gratification self too great
leverage, at least for those who, through addiction or weaknesses of
will, are unable to command themselves effectively. 197 Allowing the
present self or long-term planning self to bind the future self or
immediate gratification self seems necessary, to some extent, to
prevent the latter selves from abusing their opportunity to ignore the
demands of the former selves. 198  The law expresses societal
I suggest that the ordinary human being is sometimes not a single
rational individual. Some of us, for some decisions, are more like a
small collectivity than like the textbook consumer. Conflict occurs
not only when two distinct human beings choose together but also
within a single one; and individuals may not make decisions in
accordance with the postulates of rationality, if by individuals we
mean live people.
Schelling, supra note 192, at 58.
196. Cass Sunstein argues against this criticism, stating that laws may
"reflect the public's 'preferences about preferences.' The phenomenon of
conscious selection of preferences is hardly uncommon, its manifestation in
law suggests that people in their capacity as citizens may seek laws that differ
from their choices in their capacity as consumers." Cass R. Sunstein, Legal
Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1135 (1986).
197. Of course, society often has an interest, generally, in choosing one self
over another, even apart from questions of authenticity. To the extent society
benefits from long-term planning, it may favor the self-binding self over the
immediate gratification self, for example. See SCHELLING, CHOICE AND
CONSEQUENCE, supra note 193, at 91 (stating "[W]e are not impartial. We
have our own stake in the way people behave. For my comfort and
convenience I prefer that people act civilized, drive carefully, not lose their
tempers when I am around or beat their wives and children. I like them to get
their work done.").
198. See Schelling, supra note 192, at 59 (noting certain instances where a
person might deprive himself of some opportunities, such as a well-stocked
liquor cabinet, because a future or alternative self might "abuse the
opportunity.").
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preferences about these types of decisions by determining which type
of present decision will have a future binding effect. 1
99
Raz notes that limitations of autonomy are appropriate where the
specific limitation increases overall autonomy. He states, "A moral
theory which values autonomy highly can justify restricting the
autonomy of one person for the sake of the greater autonomy of
others or even of that person himself in the future."
200
The duration of the self-limitation of autonomy should also be
taken into account, as short-term limitations of autonomy are easier
to justify. Not only do they cause less restriction of overall
autonomy because of their short duration, but also there is less risk
that, during the term of the self-imposed limitation of autonomy, the
person involved would alter her second-order volitions in such a way
that the self-restriction of autonomy would no longer express her
truest considered desire. 201 For this reason, someone who chooses to
become a "slave for a day" as part of a charity auction seems less
likely to have her autonomy threatened than one who sells herself
into slavery for a year or for life, if such a sale were allowed.
Another aspect to be considered is whether the person choosing
self-limitation of autonomy has any way to lift the self-restriction,
either on a temporary or permanent basis, should his second-order
volitions genuinely change. 20 2 In this way, a self-limiter can reduce
199. Elster notes that there is often an asymmetry in which one self tries to
bind the other, with the sober self acting far more often to bind the drunken
self than vice versa, and persons trying to bind themselves to their long-term
interests rather than to their short-term interests. See ELSTER, supra note 151,
at 22. He argues that this asymetry can be viewed as a justification for
choosing the dictates of the self-binding self over the self seeking release. See
id.
200. RAZ, supra note 121, at 419.
201. See Dworkin, supra note 154, at 27-28. Dworkin insists that not only
the duration of the restriction, but also the rapidity by which the restriction
takes place affect the magnitude of the restriction's effect, as they are
connected to whether the restriction can be reversed without the aid of another
party. See id.
202. See id. ("Given our knowledge of the possibility of changing tastes,
desires, new knowledge and so forth, we wish to maintain some options for
reversing our behavior."). Bernard Berofsky argues that there is no loss of
autonomy in subordinating oneself to authority where the subordinator retains
the right to review that decision as well as the power to take whatever actions
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the loss of flexibility that is one of the greatest risks of pre-
203commitment. Even when the underlying bases for the limitation
remain valid, a person may need a temporary reprieve from the
restrictions, like permission to take a sip of champagne at a
wedding.
20 4
How a person lifts these restrictions should depend on whether
the restrictions are designed to prevent a person from succumbing to
his own weakness of will and whether a significant portion of the
benefit of the limitation of autonomy comes from the fact that the
self-limiter cannot easily release himself from the limitation. To
protect the person from merely caving in to first-order desires that
the self-limitation of autonomy was designed to thwart, some
protections may need to be put into place to ensure that the later
decision is a considered, reflective one. Where the individual is
attempting to protect himself from his own weakness of will, or
where the efficacy of the limitation depends on its binding nature, the
self-limitation program could require the person to appeal to a
neutral party, for example, and demonstrate to that neutral party that
the person's second-order volitions had changed or that
circumstances had changed so that the self-restriction was no longer205
necessary or beneficial. In Bruce Winick's words, "People should
be allowed to lock the door and hide the key, but not to throw it
away. '206 If the approval process, finding a well-hidden key, as it
the review indicates is appropriate. See Bernard Berofsky, LIBERATION FROM
SELF: A THEORY OF PERSONAL AUTONOMY 127 (1995) (quoted in Nickel,
supra note 191, at 16 (referring to this process as "review and escape")).
203. See ELSTER, supra note 151, at 81 ("By keeping one's options open one
may be able to gather new information and make a better decision than by
foreclosing them permanently.").
204. This argument and example is from Thomas C. Schelling, Self-
Command. A New Discipline, in CHOICE OVER TIME 167, 175 (George
Loewenstein & Jon Elster ed., 1992).
205. Even if the neutral party is likely to approve such request, having to
seek such approval is, by itself, something of a deterrent. See Schelling, supra
note 190, at 373.
206. Winick, supra note 184, at 87. Winick was discussing whether people
should be able to make irrevocable mental health advance care directives
specifying what treatment they are to receive in the future, even should they
later reject that treatment. Winick proposed that the signer of such a directive
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were, inevitably takes some time, such delay could give the self-
limiter time to withdraw his request to be freed from his self-
restriction. Schelling praises this effect, stating, "It is remarkable
how effective delays can be... the delay often seems to block
relapse. ' '2°7
Using Feinberg's example, if a partygoer initially asked the
party's host to deny her drinks after her first one, so that she might
drive safely home, she might later appeal to the host to allow her
another drink and show the host that she was being driven home by a
sober friend. Upon such a showing, the host could give the partygoer
another drink without undermining her autonomy or put her off for a
few minutes to see if she renews her request for another drink.2 °8
Other factors that should be examined to determine the
appropriateness of the limitation of autonomy include the scope of
the limitation and the external cost of enforcing the limitation. If a
person wants to limit only one discrete aspect of one's autonomy,
such as the ability to smoke cigarettes, that limitation is much less
worrisome than the complete limitation that selling oneself into
slavery would represent. Limiting autonomy is also less burdensome
where the person would be unlikely to engage in the forbidden
activity even without the restriction. Barring one from entering Paris
would be more limiting to the average Frenchman than to the
average Kansan.
The cost to the self-limiter and to third parties of monitoring and
enforcing the limitation of autonomy should also be a factor in
determining whether that limitation should be enforced. If the
chosen restriction is inexpensive to enforce, then it is much more
appealing than a restriction that would force many others to change
their behaviors or to bear the cost of the enforcement. Someone who
would apply to a court or administrative body for release from the directive.
See id. Elster also distinguishes between throwing away and giving away the
key, giving several examples from life and literature of people giving the
authority to deny them drugs, liquor, or money to others. See ELSTER, supra
note 151, at 65-68.
207. Schelling, supra note 204, at 174.
208. In this example, other important concerns besides autonomy are
obviously implicated, such as the safety of the partygoer.
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wants to be prevented from practicing law, and therefore does not
pay her bar dues, will cost society little, since society already takes
pains to prevent non-lawyers from practicing law. By comparison,
someone who wants to be prevented from walking along sidewalks
in major cities can hardly expect police officers to spend their time
attempting to prevent her from engaging in such perambulation.
Also, if other parties might be affected in dealing with a self-limited
party, we should consider whether those other parties would or
should understand the possibility and effects of such self-limitation
and can easily determine whether such self-limitation is in effect.
Otherwise, parties may rely on some actions or promise of the self-
limiter to their detriment and so be harmed when the self-limitation
is enforced.
We should also question how reliably the self-limitation of
autonomy can be enforced, as those which are enforced only fitfully
may have less usefulness than those easy to enforce reliably.2 °9
Reliability may cut two ways, in that limitations that are highly
reliable may more consistently accomplish their purposes, but also
may more completely limit the autonomy of the self-limiter. If the
unreliability is in the hands of the self-limiter, then it provides a
means of escape.
In short, determining whether to enforce an individual's decision
to limit her own autonomy depends on the following interrelated
questions:
1) Is her decision the type that, in general, increases
rather than decreases one's overall autonomy?
2) How long does the self-limitation of autonomy last?
3) What is the scope of the limitation of autonomy?
4) Is the amount of autonomy she might give up so great
or the risk that she may have erred in thinking she will
be better off so high that the danger of an incorrect
decision outweighs the benefits that she likely hopes to
receive in return?
209. See Schelling, supra note 190, at 364 (stating that good rules of self-
limitation are those "most readily, most easily, and most reliably enforced.").
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5) When is the self-limiter likely to be acting more freely
and more true to her essential self: when she decides
to limit her autonomy or when later she decides to
revoke or transgress against that limitation?
6) Is there some method by which the self-limiter can, in
a considered and reflective manner, be freed,
temporarily or permanently, from the self-restriction
should her second-order volitions change or she
require a temporary exception?
7) Is there an overall harm or benefit to the self-limiter or
to society by allowing this form of self-limitation apart
from its effect on the autonomy of the individual self-
limiter?
8) What are the monitoring and enforcement costs to the
self-limiter and third parties for this self-limitation of
autonomy?
9) How reliable is the enforcement of the self-limitation?
These various tests for whether someone's self-limitations of
autonomy should be enforced can be separated into: subjective tests,
those that focus on whether the individual's decision to self-limit is a
trustworthy declaration of that particular person's most free and
autonomous decision; and objective tests, which focus on whether
the type of decision the individual has made will, in general, increase
their autonomy or otherwise benefit or harm them or others.
These tests may also be separated into those that protect the
substantive independence of the individual (tests one through four);
those that protect person's the procedural independence (tests five,
six, and, to some extent, nine); and those that protect third-party
interests or non-autonomy interests of the self-limiter (tests seven,
eight, and, to some extent, nine). A person's substantive
independence is protected if the decision to self-limit increases, or at
least does not diminish, the person's overall independence of action
or thought. 2 0  By contrast, one's procedural independence is
protected if the method by which one limits her autonomy ensures
that she fully intends to limit her independence and is not doing so as
210. See Dworkin, supra note 154, at 25.
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the result of such outside forces as deception, coercion, and
manipulation. 2 1  The outcomes of these tests should be weighed
against each other, and greater substantive limitations should require
more extensive procedural protections.
The distinction between substantive and procedural
independence is not always a tidy one, as the two tend to bleed into
each other. It could be argued that, where someone has effectively
renounced all substantive independence and has completely adopted
another's will for her own, providing procedural independence adds
no real freedom or autonomy, since the renouncer may have
effectively renounced her ability to benefit from the procedural
independence as well.212 However, it seems just as likely that
providing procedural independence creates or preserves some level
of substantive independence. Someone who has asked to be thrown
into prison for the remainder of his life has more substantive
independence if, at the beginning of every day, his jailor asks him if
he still desires to be imprisoned for the rest of his days, offering to
release him if he does not.
213
Given that some limitations on autonomy can enhance
autonomy, the challenge is in determining how such autonomy-
enhancing restrictions can be put into place. Clearly, the borrower
will often be unable to put the restrictions into place herself, through
contract law, for if she could so protect herself, she would not likely
need these restrictions in the first place.214  However, when her
211. See id.; see also Nickel, supra note 191, at 1-2 (discussing the
distinction between substantive and procedural independence).
212. See Nickel, supra note 191, at 16 (arguing that a minimum substantive
autonomy is necessary for procedural independence).
213. The jailed man would be more substantively free even while refusing
release if only because he could, while still jailed, make plans to be released
the next day.
214. See Milton D. Green, Proof of Mental Incompetency and the
Unexpressed Major Premise, 53 YALE L.J. 271, 304 (1944).
In the normal situation there is a rough equivalency of exchange in the
contract obligations of the parties. It is only in the abnormal or
atypical case that there is a gross inadequacy of consideration. But
such inadequacy is per se legally inconsequential. However, when it
is coupled with a charge of fraud, undue influence, or mental
incompetency, the picture immediately changes. Inadequacy of
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autonomy is threatened, either by the fraud, coercion, or
manipulation of the unscrupulous lender, or by her own weaknesses
of mind, body, or financial condition, then the homeowner requires
protection outside of contract law and her own ability to say no to
protect her and preserve her autonomy.215 This need for protection
would justify government intervention to protect the homeowner's
autonomy by restricting it.2 16 Still, not every elder needs or may
want restrictions beyond those provided to younger homeowners.
One workable resolution to this dilemma would be to provide
additional protective restrictions to those elderly homeowners who
desire them, while leaving those who resist or decline such
restriction free to contract, with only the general anti-predatory
lending legislation to protect them. Such a system would not
compromise the autonomy of elder homeowners, because they could
simply opt not to be more protected than their younger peers.
To discover how such a system of voluntary abdication of
autonomy could function, it is helpful to look to another consumer
field, that of casino gambling, where an analogous system has been
put into use. States are beginning to allow problem gamblers to
restrict their own freedom to enter casinos in order to help these
gamblers conquer their gambling compulsion while leaving others
free to gamble.
consideration, then, takes on significance: it becomes an important
element to be considered.
Id.
215. Fallon defines "coercion" as "the deliberate and wrongful subjecting of
one human being to the will of another or domination that disrespects the
other's equal moral worth," and "manipulation" as involving "a similar
judgment of moral wrongness. It implies a perversion of someone's thinking,
deciding, or acting." Fallon, supra note 123, at 889.
216. Raz states:
So if the government has a duty to promote the autonomy of people
the harm principle allows it to use coercion both in order to stop
people from actions which would diminish people's autonomy and in
order to force them to take actions which are required to improve
people's options and opportunities.
RAZ, supra note 121, at 416.
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VIII. SELF-EXCLUSION AS PROTECTION FROM PROBLEM GAMBLING
One method of providing protection from excessive gambling,
while respecting the autonomy of the problem gambler, is the
process of self-exclusion. Self-exclusion is a system, implemented
to varying degrees in several states, whereby problem gamblers can
request to be personally excluded from one or more, or perhaps all,
of the casinos in the state. 217 Once the gamblers sign up for self-
exclusion, their names are put on a list that, depending on the state's
laws, may be circulated to casinos statewide. If anyone on the self-
exclusion list is found in a casino, the state will mandate some
punishment that may include ejection, seizing winnings, and possibly
even incarceration. In addition, those who sign up for self-exclusion
may, depending on state law, have their names removed from
casinos' mailing lists used to send advertisements and other
promotional materials to gamblers and find their lines of credit and
check-cashing privileges at casinos terminated.218
The self-exclusion program is a classic example of the self-
limitation of autonomy as a method of consumer protection.219 Like
Ulysses, the compulsive gambler recognizes that he will be unable to
resist the siren call of the casinos, and seeks a way to limit his own
freedom. Gerald Dworkin's description of Ulysses can equally
describe a compulsive gambler who signs up for self-exclusion,
217. See Kevin Ferguson, Casino Self-Exclusion Programs Grow, Called a
'Work in Progress', LAS VEGAS SUN, Oct. 31, 2001, available at
http://www.lasvegassun.com/sunbin/stories/text/2001/oct/31/512557949.html
(last visited Sept. 24, 2001) (discussing the various self-exclusion programs
started by Nevada, New Jersey, Illinois, Missouri, Michigan, and Louisiana).
218. See id.
219. Schelling anticipated such a legal procedure enforcing self-limitation of
autonomy, though he predicted a delay until its fruition, when he stated:
I do not conclude that the dangers are so overwhelming that we should
continue to deny any legitimacy to the demand for legal status for
these unilateral self-commitments ... I conclude . . . that there are
probably innovations along the lines I have suggested, and that with
care there might be some tentative exploration, with adequate
safeguards and the expectation that it may be years or generations
before we converge on a reasonable legal philosophy.
Schelling, supra note 192, at 73.
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hoping that he can stop himself from gambling even though he
knows that he will want to gamble.
He wants to have his freedom limited so that he can
survive. Although his behavior at the time he hears the
sirens may not be voluntary-he struggles against his bonds
and orders his men to free him-there is another dimension
of his conduct that must be understood. He has a
preference about his preferences, a desire not to have or to
act upon various desires .... In limiting his liberty, in
accordance with his wishes, we promote, not hinder his
efforts to define the contours of his life.
220
A. State Self-Exclusion Programs for Problem Gamblers: The
Missouri Model
The first statewide self-exclusion list, as well as perhaps the
most stringent, is operated by the state of Missouri, which began its
program in 1996.221  Notably, Missouri's program provides that
anyone who signs up for a self-exclusion list is banned for life from
entering any of Missouri's casino/riverboats. 222 If they try to ignore
the ban and gamble on one of Missouri's riverboats anyway, those on
the self-excluded lists are to be removed from the boat, and "the
licensee shall cooperate with the commission agent in reporting the
incident to the proper prosecuting authority and request charges be
filed... for criminal trespassing, a class B misdemeanor."
223
220. DWORKIN, supra note 133, at 15.
221. For Missouri's rules governing self-exclusion, see MO. CODE REGS.
ANN. tit. 11, §§ 45-17.010-17.050 (2000), available at
http://www.sos.state.mo.us/adrules/csr/current/1 Icsr/1 1csr.asp (last visited
Sept. 10, 2002). Missouri's program is "the most comprehensive self-
exclusion program," according to Carol O'Hare, executive director of the
Nevada Council on Problem Gaming. Clayton Bellamy, Problem Gamblers
Keep Advocate Busy in Year-Old Missouri Post, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH,
June 17, 2001, at Cl, available at 2001 WL 4467297. For information
regarding the 1996 start date of the program, see Ferguson, supra note 217.
222. See MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 11, § 45-17.050 (stating that "[a]ny
person who has been placed on the List of Disassociated Persons shall remain
on the List permanently and may not petition to be removed.").
223. Id. § 45-17.010(2)(A); see also Virginia Young, Blacklist Lets
Gamblers Ban Themselves at Illinois Casinos; Program Replaces One Where
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Self-excluded gamblers are to be denied any winnings if they
somehow manage to come aboard a riverboat, gamble, and win.224
As of July 2002, more than 4,200 gamblers had self-excluded
themselves in Missouri alone, with another 100 new names added
per month.225 An estimated five to eight self-banned gamblers are
arrested monthly in Missouri while attempting to violate their self-
exclusion.226 On eighty-eight occasions during 1999, self-excluded
gamblers were arrested in Missouri for violating their self-ban, with
a dozen of the offenders arrested more than once.
227
Other states are more lenient than Missouri and allow gamblers
to have their name removed from the list. After five years of self-
exclusion, for example, those in Illinois' and Louisiana's self-
exclusion programs can be removed from the exclusion list if they
obtain a determination from a mental health professional that they no
longer suffer from a gambling addiction.
228
Excluding gamblers from casinos is only one of several forms of
self-exclusion that can be used to reduce gambling by problem or
pathological gamblers. For example, gamblers can request that they
Individual Boats Policed Addicts, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, July 16, 2002, at
B 1, available at 2002 WL 2573911 (discussing how Illinois' program for self-
exclusion is less strict than Missouri's program).
224. See MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 11, § 45-5.065(2); see also Virginia
Young, Missouri Wants to Know if Self-Banning Program Works; Study Will
Ask Whether Problem Gamblers Benefit, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 1,
2002, at Al, available at 2002 WL 2538034 (discussing the success of
Missouri's self-banning program).
225. See Young, supra note 224, at Al.; Chris Fusco, 'Blacklist' to Help
Gamblers Get a Grip; Program Lets Addicts Ban Themselves from State's
Casinos, CHI. SUN-TiMEs, July 15, 2002, at 8, available at 2002 WL 6465123.
226. See Can Gambling Addicts Sue Casinos for Losses? Missouri's
Voluntary Exclusion Program May Spawn Lawsuits, Mo. LAW. WKLY, Dec.
18, 2001, available at http://www.lawyersweeklyusa.com/resources/
pressrelease/pressrelease 1218.htm (last visited Aug. 8, 2002).
227. See Craig Savoye, Casinos Stop Gamblers Who Stop Themselves, THE
CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, Feb. 29, 2000, available at
http://www.csmonitor.com/cgi-bin-article.pl?script/2000/02/29/p 1 s5.txt (last
visited Dec. 27, 2001). Many of these arrests are believed to have led to
probation. See id.
228. See Young, supra note 223, at B1. For Louisiana's similar term, see
LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 42, §§ III:304(C)(3), (G)(2)-(3), REGALERT, Apr. 20,
2002, available at 2002 WL 18777378.
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be prevented from obtaining money from casino automated teller
machines (ATMs), and at least some providers of ATM services will
honor that request.229  Slot machines can be designed so that the
customer can set the machine to shut down when either a set amount
of time or a set sum of player losses occurs.
230
B. The Effectiveness of Self-Exclusion Programs in the Gaming
Industry
Because self-exclusion programs are so new, little study has
been conducted to determine their effectiveness. 23' One study of a
casino's self-exclusion program found that eighty percent of the self-
excluded gamblers surveyed stopped gambling at the casino during
the two years the program had been in effect, but that most of those
who violated the self-exclusion program "did so full throttle,
gambling nine or more times."232 The leader of the study noted that
the prime motivation of those who violated the self-exclusion
program was money, while the "determination to stay abstinent and
fear of arrest" were the chief reasons the others stayed out of the
casinos. 233 The self-exclusion program also appeared useful as a
229. See Rachel Brand, Hard-Core Gamblers Dealt a Helping Hand, Casino
ATM Firm to Share Database of Players Who Ask to Curb Their Access to
Cash, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Mar. 18, 2001, at IG, available at 2001 WL
7367182.
230. See Scott MacKay, States Bank on Gambling, But Funds for Treatment
Lag, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL. (R.I.), May 19, 2002, at FO1, available at 2002 WL
5520231.
231. See Young, supra note 224, at Al; see also Rick Aim, Expert Questions
Gambling Programs: Missouri Loss Limit, Lifetime Ban Faulted, KAN. CITY
STAR, June 20, 2002, at C8, available at http://n112.newsbank.com (stating
that Robert Ladouceur "acknowledged... that there had been almost no
academic study on the effects of self-exclusion... ").
232. Fusco, supra note 225, at 8; see also Rhode Island Special House
Commission to Study Gaming: Hearing Before the House Finance Committee
Study Commission, at 14 (R.I. 2002) (testimony of Dr. Marvin A. Steinberg,
Executive Director of the Connecticut Council on Problem Gambling and
leader of their study on problem gambling), available at
www.rilin.state.ri.us/gen__assembly/gaming/080602.htm (last visited Nov. 14,
2002) [hereinafter Testimony of Marvin A. Steinberg].
233. Fusco, supra note 225, at 8 (quoting Marvin A. Steinberg).
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"gateway" to lead problem gamblers to obtain professional
counseling for about half of those who self-excluded.234
A study of the self-exclusion program at a Quebec casino
concluded, "It is perhaps surprising that this intervention [self-
exclusion] achieved better results than those of a well-established
self-help group such as the GA [Gamblers Anonymous]. 235  The
researchers noted, "This self-exclusion procedure appears to provide
a very powerful alternative to pathological gamblers who feel they
need to modify their gambling habits. The impact of the finding that
30% of participants report complete success with previous self-
exclusion attempts cannot be overstated.,
236
The greatest potential flaw of these self-exclusion programs
appears to be their unreliability, the ease with which gamblers can
circumvent them, either by going to a different casino in a state
which does not have a central registry, or by tricking the casinos to
allow them to gamble. One compulsive gambler described beating
Missouri's strict program by acquiring a new driver's license under
her maiden name or by borrowing a friend's boarding pass to get into
the riverboat casinos. 237 Even when her husband called the nearby
casinos to plead with them to keep his wife from gambling and she
was arrested four times for trespassing, the husband said that the
resulting fines were little deterrence because she, like other
compulsive gamblers, is "used to losing a whole lot more than that in
one night.
238
234. Id. (quoting Marvin A. Steinberg); see also Testimony of Marvin A.
Steinberg, supra note 232, at 14.
235. Robert Ladouceur et al., Analysis of a Casino's Self-Exclusion
Program, 16 J. GAMBLING STUD. 453, 458 (2000).
236. Id. at 459-60. The report notes the limits of the study, in that no
comparison group was used, the participants of the study were all self-selected,
and the data presented was all founded upon self-reports of the participants.
See id. at 460. Furthermore, because the study focused on only one casino, its
results "might be suspect to over-interpretation." Self-Help, Self-Exclusion,
THE WAGER, 6 (14), Apr. 4, 2001, available at www.thewager.org/Backindex/
vol6pdf/wager6l4.pdf (last visited Aug. 8, 2002).
237. See Young, supra note 224, at Al.
238. Id.
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Potential methods do exist for making self-exclusion programs
more effective in keeping out banned players, though the costs,
monetary and otherwise, to such methods may be high. For example,
a casino in the Netherlands reportedly requires its customers to carry
an identification card with a magnetized strip which, when swiped
through a reader, tells casino employees whether the cardholder is on
the self-exclusion list.239 In Australia, a plan has been proposed to
provide self-excluded gamblers an electronic device they could
voluntarily have attached to their wrist or ankle that would trigger an
alarm if they enter a gambling parlor. After the device is attached, it
cannot be removed without the use of special tools not available to
the general public.
240
Similarly, casinos could use biometric face recognition
technology to scan the faces of incoming gamblers and match them
against a database of the facial characteristics of self-excluded
gamblers. Such a system uses cameras linked to computers running
software that "scans the face and translates spatial relationships
between various parts of the face into a unique numeric template,
which is compared to a database for matching purposes., 241 This
automatic system could immediately notify casino officials that a
self-excluded gambler has entered a gambling arena, allowing them
quickly to eject the excluded gambler or have him arrested.
While both the tracking device and the face recognition
technology have the distinct and distressing appearance of Big
Brother in action, it is important to note that casinos are already
using face recognition technology, though in an effort to protect their
own purses, not to help pathological gamblers fight their
239. See John Steams, Self-Exclusion Programs Show Potential, RENO
GAZETTE-J., June 15, 2002, at 8, available at 2002 WL 19310468.
240. See Aussie State Plans Wristband Alarms for Gambling Addicts,
STRAITS TIMEs (Sing.), June 18, 2002, available at 2002 WL 21254719.
241. Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario, Investigation Report,
Investigation PC-010005-1, The Use of Biometric Face Recognition
Technology in Ontario Casinos 2 (Feb. 26, 2001), available at
http://www.ipc.on.ca/english/orders/invest-p/pc010005.htm (last visited Sept.
3, 2002) [hereinafter Biometric Face Recognition Report].
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addiction. 242  Casinos have banded together to create the Casino
Information Network, which is an online system connecting casinos
throughout North America, allowing them to send each other facial
scans of individuals who have been expelled from a casino for
allegedly cheating.243  The company that provides the face-
recognition technology also provides a Casino Information Database,
which in early 2001 had scanned about 800 faces of "known and
suspected casino cheats. 244 By 2002, more than 150 casinos were
using this technology, with some casinos employing more than a
thousand cameras for the necessary surveillance.
245
C. An Analysis of Self-Exclusion as a Self-Limitation ofAutonomy
Self-exclusion is a stark form of the self-limitation of autonomy
in that the self-excluder intentionally relinquishes a freedom, the
freedom to gamble, held by almost all other adult members of
society. If we apply the analysis gleaned from Dworkin and
Frankfurt, however, we see that this limitation of autonomy may well
increase the autonomy of the self-excluder. Those willing to subject
themselves to a ban have likely concluded that, while they may want
on a day-to-day basis to gamble at a casino, they recognize that such
gambling is detrimental to them and wish they could conquer these
harmful desires. To use the Dworkin/Frankfurt terminology, they
have a second-order volition to stop their gambling compulsion, to
stop being the type of person with a relentless desire to gamble.
Without outside help, their second-order desire might not be strong
242. See Steve Gold, Big Brother Is Watching You At The Mirage,
NEWSBYTES, Apr. 11, 2000, available at 2000 WL 2275889 (stating, "Viisage
Technology and Biometrica Systems have announced the installation of a full-
scale biometrics facial recognition system at the Mirage Resort in Las
Vegas.").
243. See Biometric Face Recognition Report, supra note 241, at 3-4; see
also Gold, supra note 242 (noting the timely exchange of information made
possible by the Casino Information Network).
244. See Biometric Face Recognition Report, supra note 241, at 3.
245. See Benjamin Spillman, Desert Sun Casinos Embrace High-tech
Security, DESERT SUN, Jan. 21, 2002, at El, available at 2002 WL 25908332;
Corrina Stellitano, Face Value, ACCESS CONTROL & SEC. SYS. INTEGRATION
at 40, Aug. 1, 2002, available at 2002 WL 14391334.
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enough to prevent their first-order desire to gamble from dragging
them into a casino and causing them to lose too much money.
246
The self-exclusion program is intended to allow their second-
order desire to triumph over their dangerous first-order compulsion,
to allow them to have the option of identifying with the desire to stop
gambling, and to have that identification have an actual effect.
Because the autonomy of individuals is determined by their ability to
choose among their first-order desires in a considered way, the self-
exclusion program increases the autonomy of those who bar
themselves to the extent it is effective in preventing them from
gambling. Many gamblers can, through fear of arrest if nothing else,
keep themselves from entering the casinos where their compulsion to
gamble will overwhelm their will and desire to avoid gambling. If it
can prove effective, self-exclusion allows the compulsive gambler's
better self, that part more concerned with the long-term effect of the
gambler's actions, to gain control despite the personal flaws that
might otherwise overwhelm the better self.
The previously discussed tests of self-limitation of autonomy
indicate the appropriateness of these self-exclusion programs if,
without excessive cost, they prove effective in preventing gambling
by the self-excluded. 247 A gambler's choice to self-exclude will, in
general, likely increase rather than decrease his overall autonomy, at
least if it aids the gambler to defeat his addiction. The amount of
autonomy the gambler gives up will likely be small so long as he
honors the self-exclusion, since he is still free in every other aspect
246. Thaddeus Pope makes the same argument regarding cigarette addiction,
stating:
Addiction makes the LODs [lower order desires] insusceptible to
HODs [higher order desires]; that is, the individual doesn't want to
want to smoke but just can't help it. This makes the decision to
smoke-or to continue to smoke-less than substantially voluntary.
Just as lack of knowledge (regarding the risks of smoking) prevents
individuals from autonomously deciding whether to smoke, so does
the coercive or compulsive pressure imposed by addiction impinge on
autonomy.
Thaddeus Mason Pope, Balancing Public Health Against Individual Liberty:
The Ethics of Smoking Regulations, 61 U. PIT. L. REv. 419, 469 (2000).
247. See supra Part VII.D (discussing the various self-limitation tests).
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of his life. The risk that he may have erred in his thinking also seems
small, since existing evidence indicates that almost all those who
self-exclude are problem gamblers.248 Perhaps most importantly, a
gambler is likely to be acting more freely and more true to his
essential self when he initially decides to limit his autonomy, rather
than later, when his compulsion to gamble would push him to reenter
a casino. 249 To sign up for self-exclusion in Illinois, for example, a
problem gambler can go to the Illinois Gaming Board offices at
casinos or in its primary offices, or at such agencies as the Northern
Illinois Council on Alcoholism and Substance Abuse.250 Most likely,
people would put much more consideration and thought into going to
a gaming board office and self-excluding than they would to
dropping quarters into a slot machine.
Of course, if the gambler refuses to abide by his self-exclusion
and he lives in a state such as Missouri that threatens violators with
criminal sanctions, then the gambler risks a significant loss of
freedom. 251 On the one hand, it seems troubling that a gambler who
signs up to be self-excluded from casinos with all good intentions to
break her addiction may find herself facing jail time if her addiction
proves too strong, while another equally addicted gambler remains
free because she never even tried to break her addiction. On the
other hand, defenders of Missouri's law can argue that the self-
exclusion offender who sneaks on board the gambling boats risks
prosecution not solely because she gambled, but also because she
248. Steinberg states, "Almost all of the self-excluders were found to be
serious problem gamblers.... ." Testimony of Marvin A. Steinbert, supra note
232, at 14.
249. The gambler's decision to self-exclude is akin to Feinberg's example of
the guest at a party who asks his host to limit him to two drinks. In both
instances, the initial thoughtful decision seems a more genuine statement of the
person's second-order desires than when the "compulsive, excited, abandoned
future self renounces [the] earlier request." FEINBERG, supra note 118, at 82.
250. See Douglas Holt, Problem gamblers sign on to blacklist: Step bars
them from riverboats, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 5, 2002, at 1, available at 2002 WL
102287779.
251. See supra notes 221-227 and accompanying text (discussing Missouri's
law regarding violation of the self-exclusion program).
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obtained access to the gambling boats under false pretences, by using
a false identification, for example.
25 2
Determining whether problem gamblers gain or lose freedom if
a state potentially helps them free themselves from their addiction,
by threatening them with jail time, depends on two factors: (1) how
effective the threat is in aiding problem gamblers, which would
generally increase their autonomy, and (2) how often the threat is
carried out, which could limit their autonomy. For this reason,
further study of the effectiveness of exclusion programs is crucial to
determine their implications for autonomy.
Overall, society would benefit by allowing these gamblers to
self-exclude, if doing so would diminish some of the social costs of
problem gambling.2 5 3  However, some methods of accomplishing
self-exclusion, such as using face-recognition software to scan
everyone entering the casino, may so diminish the freedom and
privacy of other gamblers that they should not be employed for the
purposes of effectuating the self-exclusion program. 254 Furthermore,
our previous discussion of autonomy indicates that autonomy will be
more fully protected if the self-excluder is given a reflective,
considered method by which to be removed from the list of excluded
gamblers, such as obtaining the certification of a mental health
professional that removal from the self-exclusion list is
appropriate. 2 55  Also, study should be conducted to see whether
252. See supra note 237 and accompanying text (discussing methods for
excluded gamblers to violate their self-exclusion).
253. See FEINBERG, supra note 118, at 28-31.
254. A more difficult question is whether a casino that already employs face
recognition software to exclude known cheats should also be forced to use the
same system to exclude self-excluded problem gamblers. If a casino is already
scanning the faces of all incoming gamblers, it does not seem that matching
those faces against previous scans of problem gamblers would, by itself,
significantly undermine the autonomy of the general gambling public.
However, tying self-exclusion programs to face recognition software may
make these programs unpopular, by fostering the notion that the self-exclusion
program is requiring the casino to spy on its patrons, rather than the casino
doing so for its own monetary purposes. This unpopularity may, in time, cause
the self-exclusion program to be eliminated or watered down, and so, might
completely undermine the usefulness of the face-recognition software.
255. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
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self-exclusion is as effective when it is not permanent, for the
limitation of autonomy is easier to justify when it is for a limited
256time.
IX. ELDER HELP INSTRUMENTS: A PROPOSAL FOR SENIOR
HOMEOWNER PROTECTION THROUGH SELF-LIMITATION OF
AUTONOMY
If self-exclusion can, by limiting the autonomy of problem
gamblers, maximize their overall autonomy, an analogous system
could serve the same purpose in the fight against predatory lending.
In the lending arena, the autonomy of the homeowners/borrowers is
not typically threatened by a compulsion to borrow, but rather by
unscrupulous mortgage brokers who seek to manipulate, coerce, or
deceive borrowers into accepting an overpriced or otherwise
dangerous loan.
25 7
If predatory lending is made possible by the freedom of the
elderly to enter into loans with harsh terms, then we can conceive of
a system allowing elders to exclude themselves from loans with
problem terms. Instead of keeping them out of casinos, a self-
exclusion program for homeowners would prevent them from
obtaining overpriced, predatory loans and would increase their
overall autonomy by limiting their freedom to enter into harmful
loans.
To accomplish this self-exclusion from high-priced loans, I
propose a system whereby elder homeowners can voluntarily exclude
themselves from entering into high cost loans or loans with any of a
set of potentially confusing or harsh terms. This task could be
accomplished by a legislative enactment that would provide the
following. Seniors would be able to sign a formal document, to be
called the "Elder Home Equity Loan Protection Instrument" ("Elder
HELP Instrument") which would be notarized and recorded at the
256. See discussion of the duration of the limitation of autonomy as a factor
in whether such limitation is appropriate at note 201 and accompanying text.
257. Dworkin notes, "Both coercion and deception infringe upon the
voluntary character of the agent's actions. In both cases a person will feel
used, will see herself as an instrument of another's will." DWORKIN, supra
note 133, at 14.
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county recorder's office, much like any deed, mortgage, or deed of
trust. That document would provide that the senior homeowner
recognizes the risk he has of entering into a predatory loan and is
willing to restrict his autonomy to enter freely into loans in order to
avoid that risk. The document would then detail terms that would
either be mandatory or forbidden in any loan secured by the
borrower's residence, with restrictions much stricter than those found
in existing anti-predatory loan legislation.
Existing anti-predatory lending legislation was drafted to
accommodate the many types of borrowers who would be affected
by it. As previously discussed, current legislation provides
protections to all borrowers whose loans satisfy a "trigger" indicating
a high-cost loan, whether the individual borrower prefers the
additional protection or not.258  Because these protections are
mandatory, they have been fairly mild. For example, they do not
prohibit the lender from charging an excessive rate, but merely force
the lender to disclose the rate further in advance than would
259otherwise be required. In this way, lenders are free to charge high
interest rates and fees to borrowers with extremely poor credit
ratings, to whom they might be less willing to make loans at all if
interest rates were capped.
260
By comparison, a voluntary protection program could explicitly
bar interest rates above a certain amount calculated in reference to a
particular benchmark, or fees in excess of a certain percentage. This
elder protection program could be much stricter than existing
legislation because it would be voluntary for elders, and elders could
simply not sign the form if they found its provisions too strict.
258. See supra notes 57, 62, 66 and accompanying text (discussing the use of
"triggers" to determine covered loans in the HOEPA and in North Carolina's
anti-predatory lending legislation).
259. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (discussing disclosure and
rate caps).
260. Lenders argue that even laws that omit rate caps but provide extensive
regulation of high-cost loans will cause lenders to refuse to make loans to
borrowers with poor credit. See Andy Peters, Fair Lending Act Has Bankers
Scared, MACON TELEGRAPH (Ga.), Oct. 13, 2002, at 1, available at 2002
WL 23049584.
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For example, the Elder HELP Instrument could provide that the
elder will not agree to and will not be bound by many of the terms
used to coerce borrowers into accepting overpriced loans, and that
instead, any loan secured by the home of the signing elder will have
the following terms imposed by law:
1) No pre-payment penalties whatsoever.
2) No insurance products of any type financed by the loan
proceeds.
3) No undisclosed yield-spread premiums paid to the
broker to reward the broker for increasing the cost of
the borrower's loan.
2 6 '
4) No provisions for balloon payments.
5) No points or fees in excess of a set percentage of the
loan, with the allowable percentage increasing
somewhat for smaller loans. For example, the Elder
HELP Instrument could limit all points and fees to
three percent of the amount financed for loans over
$20,000 and a higher amount for loans under $20,000.
The form should strictly limit the total of points and
fees to a percentage of the loan that is low, but still
high enough that most borrowers would be able to find
loans with fees less than this total, even if they wanted
to reduce their interest rate by paying some points.
Limiting points and fees together to three percent of
the loan, for example, would provide sufficient
flexibility to borrowers and lenders without allowing
lenders to gouge borrowers with the huge fees that
often are imposed in the subprime market.262  This
261. Yield spread premiums are fees that lenders pay to brokers when the
borrowers delivered by the brokers agree to pay interest rates above the "par"
rate, which is the rate that the lender would be willing to accept to lend to those
particular borrowers on that particular day. See Saunders & National
Consumer Law Center, supra note 11, at 120.
262. A report by the National Information and Training Center recommends
that finance charges, including points and fees, be limited to three percent on
any loans with interest rates above eight percent. See National Training and
Information Center., Preying on Neighborhoods: Subprime Mortgage Lenders
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would provide significantly more protection than
HOEPA's current fee trigger of eight percent.
263
6) No interest rates in excess of a certain percentage over
a particular benchmark rate.
In designing the Elder HELP Instruments interest rate cap,
special attention should be given to the benchmark chosen as well as
the amount added to that benchmark to create the cap. An
appropriate benchmark would be one that generally reflects the
prevailing interest rates available in the non-predatory market. When
they are securitized and sold as bonds on Wall Street, mortgages
become subject to many of the factors affecting the prices and yields
of Treasury notes. As a result, the interest rates of mortgages
generally track the yields available for Treasury notes.264 Because
most home loans are paid off before they reach full maturity, their
rates more closely reflect the yield of Treasury notes of shorter
duration than the home loan.265 Therefore, it seems appropriate that
the yield of either five-year or ten-year Treasury notes be used as the
benchmark for the interest rate cap. Since the typical spread between
a thirty-year mortgage and a ten-year Treasury note has averaged
1.74% over the last ten years, but has sometimes widened to over
two percent, perhaps an appropriate interest limit for a thirty-year
and Chicagoland Foreclosure 36 (1999), available at http://www.ntic-
us.org/preying/preying.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2002).
263. See 15 U.S.C. § 1602(a)(1)(B)(i) (2000).
264. On average, the rates offered for thirty-year, fixed-rate mortgages
closely track those of ten-year Treasurys, though the exact spread, or
difference between the rates can shrink or widen. For example, in October
2002, the Wall Street Journal reported:
[Th]e spread, or difference, between rates on 30-year fixed-rate
mortgages and the rates on 10-year Treasurys has been widening. It
now stands at an unusually wide 2.44 percentage points vs. just 1.60
percentage points in May and an average of 1.74 percentage points
over the past 10 years, according to HSH [Associates].
Ruth Simon, Banks Make It Harder to Refinance, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 2002,
at D1, available at 2002 WL-WSJ 3408849.
265. For example, rates on fifteen-year mortgages typically track the yields
of five-year Treasury notes. See Joy C. Shaw & John Dooley, Stocks' Gloom
Becomes Bond Market's Zoom, WALL ST. J., July 19, 2002, at C12, available
at 2002 WL-WSJ 3401109.
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loan for purposes of the Elder HELP Instrument would be either a
three percent or 3.5% spread over the ten-year Treasury note, with
fifteen-year mortgages an equivalent spread over five-year Treasury
notes.266
The law creating the Elder HELP Instrument Program would
mandate that, to the extent any loan signed by the elder violated the
terms of the Elder HELP Instrument, the terms contradicting the
Elder HELP Instrument would be void and would be replaced by the
terms provided for by the Elder HELP Instrument. Any court of
competent jurisdiction could order reformation of the note. To aid
the borrower in finding counsel to represent her, the borrower should
be able to obtain her attorneys fees in any action to reform the note.
The terms and effects of the Elder HELP Instrument would expressly
apply to any and all holders of the note, including holders in due
course. Because the Elder HELP Instrument would be recorded, any
potential purchaser of the note could determine whether there was an
Elder HELP Instrument in place before purchasing the note.
267
The Elder HELP Instrument would act as a reverse contract of
adhesion. Rather than lenders being able to induce a financially
unsophisticated consumer to agree to the terms contained in a
business's form contract, instead, any lender who wanted to do
business with an elder who had signed and recorded an Elder HELP
266. See id. (noting the average spread between thirty-year mortgages and
ten-year Treasury notes). Jumbo loans, which are larger than the conforming
loans that can be purchased by the government-sponsored entities Fannie Mae
(the Federal National Mortgage Association) and Freddie Mac (the Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation), typically have interest rates about a
quarter point higher, but the spread can vary from as much as 0.75 percentage
points to 0.10 percentage points, depending on the lender. See Lew Sichelman,
New Year Will Have a Saving Ring for Borrowers, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec.
8, 2002, at Jl, available at 2002 WL 1040999527.
267. Because payment of an undisclosed yield spread premium in violation
of the Elder HELP Instrument may not be apparent to a bona fide purchaser of
a note, the homeowners' cause of action for the payment of such a premium
should be against the original broker and lender who participated in the
payment of such premium.
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Instrument would have to agree to the terms set by the Elder HELP
Instrument.268
Occasionally, there may occur instances in which an elder,
having signed an Elder HELP Instrument, would discover that he
wanted to obtain a loan which contains some terms barred by the
Elder HELP Instrument. Just as a self-excluded gambler can, in
certain jurisdictions, remove himself from the exclusion list if he has
certification from a mental health professional, 269 so too should an
elder be able to cancel the Elder HELP Instrument so long as he has
certification from a consumer credit counselor unaffiliated with the
lender that the loan is an appropriate one, or that the counselor has
discussed the benefits and detriment of the loan. 270 In this way, the
homeowner would maintain maximum autonomy, both freedom from
overreaching lenders who would attempt to manipulate the borrower
into signing an overpriced loan, but also freedom from those very
protections should they prove too constraining and the borrower
requires that the restrictions of Elder HELP Instrument be lifted.271
The Elder HELP Instrument would help loan counselors give
effective advice to borrowers by providing a template for a fair
prime-rate loan. The loan counselor then can easily focus on how
the proposed loan to the elder differs from the Elder HELP
Instrument and can advise the homeowner about the likely effects of
those differences.
One natural difficulty in the Elder HELP Instrument system
would be ensuring that elderly homeowners who might be targeted
by unscrupulous lenders will know about, sign, and record the Elder
HELP Instrument, thus affording them its protections. Those entities
268. For a discussion of contracts of adhesion, see Todd D. Rakoff,
Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1173
(1983).
269. See supra note 228 and accompanying text (discussing the certification
requirement).
270. This certification process is already used in jurisdictions such as North
Carolina which requires borrowers to receive loan counseling before they enter
into high priced loans. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
271. This ability to extricate oneself from self-limitations of autonomy
increases autonomy so long as it is designed to be done in a considered,
reflective manner. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
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attempting to educate the public about the dangers of predatory
lending could take on this task. In addition, lenders could be
required to provide their elderly borrowers with notice of the Elder
HELP Instrument program and directions on how to sign and record
the Elder HELP Instrument during the lending process.
272
Furthermore, family members who are concerned that an elder in
their family might fall prey to predatory lenders could learn about the
existence of the Elder HELP Instruments and be instructed as to their
use. In this way, these family members would finally be provided
with a useful tool to protect an elderly, vulnerable relative without
being forced to obtain a conservatorship over their relative, and thus
avoid the massive limitation of autonomy that a conservatorship
would almost inevitably entail.273
A program to allow homeowners to prevent themselves from
signing over-priced loans would satisfy the tests set forth in Section
VII for determining what forms of self-limitations of autonomy we
should respect and enforce.
274
A Is the Decision the Type That, In General, Increases Rather Than
Decreases One's Overall Autonomy?
If the borrower frees herself from some of the risk of entering
into an overpriced loan, yet retains the ability to untie herself from
the restrictions by seeking the advice of a loan counselor, it appears
that her decision to sign the Elder HELP Instrument would, in
general, increase rather than decrease her autonomy. She would be
free to consider the effects of the self-limitation of autonomy and
determine for herself whether it would help or hinder her. She could
judge whether it would aid her in her considered review and ordering
272. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 11, at 1309-10 (addressing the
difficulty of reaching potential victims of predatory lending through
educational programs).
273. Limited guardianships, touted as a way to minimize the loss of
autonomy that results from guardianships, have been little used. See Lawrence
A. Frolik, Guardianship Reform: When The Best Is The Enemy Of The Good, 9
STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 347, 354 (1998).
274. See supra notes 211-213 and accompanying text for the tests for
appropriately enforced self-limitations of autonomy.
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of her first-order desires, to see whether it will help her reach her
goals, and reject it if it would not. Even after she had chosen to be
bound by an Elder HELP Instrument, she would not be trapped by its
restrictions and could easily be released from them if she, in a
considered fashion and with the aid of a consumer credit counselor,
determines that she requires such release.
The Elder HELP Instrument would also increase the elder
homeowner's autonomy in that it would make it easier for her to
prove that she had been taken advantage of by an unscrupulous
lender. Instead of relying on senior homeowners' testimony about
what representations were made to them, testimony which may be
compromised by memory problems in some elders or death or illness
in others, a suit based on an Elder HELP Instrument would be much
more straightforward. Even a guardian for an incompetent senior or
the heirs of a deceased elder could prove that an Elder HELP
Instrument had been recorded and that the terms of the loan violated
the Elder HELP Instrument.
B. How Long Does the Self-Limitation ofAutonomy Last?
To be most effective, the Elder HELP Instrument should last for
as long as the elder owns the home, or until the elder revokes the
instrument. It would be problematic to have the instrument expire at
a set time, because a homeowner may not track carefully the
expiration date and so may be relying on a protection that no longer
exists. Even though the Elder HELP Instrument should not have a
set expiration date, so long as it is limited to seniors, it would at least
be limited to one phase of the homeowners' lives.
C. What is the Scope of the Limitation ofAutonomy?
The scope of the autonomy limited is not enormous. The signers
of Elder HELP Instruments give up the power to enter into expensive
loans without first receiving loan counseling, but remain free in all
other aspects of their lives. This limitation is far less than other
restrictions of autonomy that we freely countenance, such as joining
the military or marrying, with a quicker and easier release.
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D. Is the Amount ofAutonomy She Might Give Up So Great or the
Risk She May Have Erred in Thinking She Will be Better Off So High
That the Danger of an Incorrect Decision Outweighs the Benefits She
Likely Hopes to Receive in Return?
The freedom that the homeowner gives up is not great, since it is
merely the freedom to enter into high-cost loans or loans with
difficult terms quickly without seeking loan counseling first. A
homeowner might possibly err in signing the document, if it turns out
that she cannot obtain a loan within the restrictions of the Elder
HELP Instrument, she needs a high-cost loan or one with difficult
terms, and for some reason obtaining loan counseling is burdensome.
However, this possibility should be minimal so long as sufficient
loan counselors are available to homeowners. 275 This small risk
should normally be far outweighed by the benefit to the homeowner
of being much less likely to be bound by a high-priced loan or one
with other onerous or deceptive terms.
E. When is She Likely to be Acting More Freely and More True to
Her Essential Self When She Decides to Limit Her Autonomy or
When Later She Decides to Revoke or Transgress Against That
Limitation?
A homeowner would most likely be acting more freely and true
to her essential self when, away from the coercive pressure of the
mortgage broker, she considers and signs an Elder HELP Instrument.
By comparison, she would likely be less true to her autonomous
desires if she were to succumb to high-pressure loan tactics and sign
a high-price loan. Possibly, she may not understand all of the
ramifications of either document, especially if she has the barriers to
understanding, such as physical or mental infirmity, or lack of
education or sophistication, that predatory lenders often rely on to
sell their overpriced product.276 However, even if she does not fully
275. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (discussing loan counselor
provisions).
276. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 11, at 1280-81 (discussing how
predatory lenders take advantage of the information asymmetry between
themselves and their victims by finding borrowers who have been traditionally
cut off from the credit market and are financially unsophisticated).
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understand either document, she may still have greater faith in a
document designed by the legislature or by consumer advocates to
protect her from predatory loans than she would in mortgage
documents designed by a lender. Therefore, the Elder HELP
Instrument could more fully express the autonomous choice even of
those homeowners who lack the sophistication or education to
protect their own autonomy, simply by allowing the homeowner to
choose which party to trust-those preparing the Elder HELP
Instruments or lenders.
F Is There Some Method by Which the Self-Limiter Can, in a
Considered and Reflective Manner, be Freed, Temporarily or
Permanently, from the Self-Restriction Should Her Second-Order
Volitions Change or She Require a Temporary Exception?
The homeowner would retain the ability to revoke the Elder
HELP Instrument by going to a home loan counselor and obtaining
the counselor's certification that the loan is appropriate for the
homeowner, or that the counselor has informed the homeowner of
the benefits and detriment of the loan. In this way, the homeowner is
free to make her decision away from the coercive or manipulative
efforts of the mortgage broker and in the presence of an independent
loan counselor. One policy question that must be answered is
whether the loan counselor must certify that the waiver is in the
borrower's best interests or merely must certify that the counselor
has explained the terms and potential benefits and detriments of the
loan. While the former rule would most protect the homeowner from
overly persuasive mortgage brokers, the latter rule would do more to
guarantee the homeowner's release from the restrictions. The latter
rule would provide the least interference in the homeowner deciding
for himself whether to take the loan, but may do so at the cost of
leaving homeowners more vulnerable. Another policy question
concerns whether the waiver should be temporary, and be specific to
one loan, or be more permanent, or at least until another Elder HELP
Instrument is signed and recorded. The most autonomy enhancing
method would be to give the homeowner the option of deciding
whether to sign a mere loan-specific waiver that would be given to
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the lender, or a permanent withdrawal of the Elder HELP Instrument,
that would be recorded with the county recorder's office.
G. Is There an Overall Harm or Benefit to the Self-Limiter or to
Society by Allowing This Form of Self-Limitation Apart From Its
Effect on the Autonomy of the Individual Self-Limiter?
Lenders may claim that the Elder HELP Instrument will harm
seniors and society by cluttering up the property records and by
making it more difficult for elders to obtain loans, even elders who
chose not to execute Elder HELP Instruments. These objections,
which will be more fully addressed in the next Section, must be
balanced against the benefits to elder homeowners and to society to
be gained from this program, which I argue will more than make up
for any harm caused. The self-limiters will benefit by obtaining
loans without the barred terms, or at least by having some loan
counseling before they accept such loans. By reducing the level of
predatory lending among the elderly, society would benefit even
apart from the effect on the autonomy of elder homeowners, because
it would no longer need to provide housing to elderly homeowners
who lost their homes to predatory lenders.277 Legitimate lenders
would benefit by not losing customers to their predatory
competition.278 The cost to third parties of this self-limitation of
autonomy would include the judicial resources necessary for the
litigation of the reformation actions, since the primary result would
be litigation between the homeowner and the lender over the terms of
the loan. Lenders could avoid most of the cost of this self-limitation
by lending within the strictures of the self-limitation of autonomy.
On the other hand, society will greatly benefit from this self-
limitation of autonomy if it prevents elderly homeowners from losing
their homes to predatory lenders.
Lenders may argue that the Elder HELP Instrument program
limits lender autonomy by preventing them from freely negotiating
277. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text (discussing the
likelihood that elder victims of predatory lending will be unable to purchase a
new home and will move to a nursing home or board and care facility).
278. The advantages to legitimate lenders of ridding the market of predatory
lenders is discussed in Eggert, supra note 11, at 639-40.
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with senior homeowners over the terms of loans. They might argue
that the extra cost and burden on them of determining whether an
Elder HELP Instrument has been recorded and determining whether
a borrower has obtained loan counseling to waive the provisions of
the instrument unfairly limits their own freedom to contract and
conduct their business as they would like. However, lenders are not
and should not be free to impose whatever price terms they desire on
borrowers, but instead must reach an agreement with borrowers
regarding those terms. The Elder HELP Instrument would aid
borrowers in insisting on favorable terms, and lenders are free to
agree to the loans or not, depending on their assessment of the
profitability of lending to the senior homeowner. Therefore, lender
autonomy would not be unduly restricted by this program.
H What Are the Monitoring Costs to the Self-Limiter and Third
Parties of Enforcing This Self-Limitation ofAutonomy?
The monitoring costs to third parties are not extensive, since
lenders already conduct searches of county recorder's offices before
lending money in order to ensure that the putative homeowner
actually owns the home and to determine what loans encumber the
home at the time of the new loan. The lender needs this information
to determine what loans or other encumbrances already exist
affecting the property and to ensure that no loans will have priority
over its loan without the lender's knowledge. Commercial lenders
are likely to know of existing laws and have the ability to determine
whether the law applies in each instance. Private individuals who
originate a single loan, for example, by taking back a loan when they
sell their home, should likely be exempt from the effects of the Elder
HELP Instrument. Further monitoring and enforcement costs
include the incremental costs of maintaining a functioning court
system, though if the Elder HELP Instruments deter predatory
lending or decrease the complexity of suits arising from predatory
loans, they may actually lesson, rather than increase these costs.
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. How Reliable is the Enforcement of the Self-Limitation?
The reliability of the Elder HELP Instrument would depend in a
large part on seniors' access to effective mortgage counseling prior
to any waiver of the instrument and to legal representation upon any
breach of the instrument, as well as the ability to enforce the terms of
the Elder HELP Instrument. As noted previously, elder homeowners
often have great difficulty in protecting themselves through
litigation, as they may not have the resources, physical, mental, or
financial, to prosecute a lawsuit to a successful conclusion.
279
However, the Elder HELP Instrument would make this task
somewhat easier, as it would decrease the extent to which the elder
would be dependent on proving fraud or misrepresentation, would
involve more straightforward matters of proof, and would depend
less on the elder's memory. Furthermore, to the extent that
violations of Elder HELP Instruments could be proven on a class-
wide basis, the elder may benefit from litigation even when he does
not individually finance or direct it.
X. ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE ELDER SELF-EXCLUSION IN THE
LENDING INDUSTRY
Because the Elder HELP Instrument program would break new
ground, many issues will likely spring up in completing its design
that should be resolved, and I do not claim that this proposal is a
fully finished product, immediately ready for implementation.
Instead, I view this Article as the beginning of a discussion that
could lead to very useful new law, to a more rigorous method of
analyzing self-restriction of autonomy, and to a new way of thinking
about methods of consumer protection. In this Section, I will attempt
to respond to what I anticipate might be objections raised to this
program.
The lending industry might argue that the Elder HELP
Instrument would prevent loans signed by elders from being
securitizable, and so, would drive up the costs of loans to the
279. See discussion of this point supra notes 106-108 and accompanying
text.
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elderly.280 However, the Elder HELP Instrument program should not
greatly affect the securitizability of any loan, since, so long as the
loan's explicit terms conform to the restrictions of the Elder HELP
Instrument program, the Elder HELP Instrument program would not
change the legal rights of the borrower or provide any additional
defenses against the lender. Thus, secondary market participants
could require the originator of the loan to confirm either that no
Elder HELP Instrument has been recorded or that the loan conforms
to the Elder HELP Instrument's requirements. If the purchaser of the
note determines that the originator of the note either misrepresented
or was mistaken about the status of the note, the borrower, or the
existence of the Elder HELP Instrument, the purchaser could require
the originator to repurchase the note.28'
The lending industry could also complain that the Elder HELP
Instrument leaves lenders too vulnerable to the vagaries of the
process of recording real estate documents and lenders could make
loans between the time the senior homeowner records an Elder
HELP Instrument and when the instrument shows up on the public
indexes.282 This problem seems more a defect among archaic public
records system than a flaw in the Elder HELP Instrument program
and would not be a significant problem in jurisdictions which allow
title insurers to copy documents on the day they are presented for
recording.
283
280. For a discussion of the securitization process and its effect on the
residential mortgage process, see Eggert, supra note 11, at 534-52.
281. For a discussion of the repurchase requirements imposed by the
secondary market, see Eggert, supra note 11, at 548-49, though as noted there,
the repurchase requirements require the continued existence of a solvent
originator.
282. "Indices are essential, but far from perfect. For one thing, there is
always some interval between the time the recorder receives a document and
when it appears in an index. That interval can be as short as an hour or as long
as several months." GEORGE LEFCOE, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 218 (3d
ed. 1999).
283. See id. at n.7. Lefcoe notes that, where title insurers are allowed to
copy documents when they are filed, "[d]ocuments are immediately entered
into the title insurer's index, thus avoiding the risks of the gap between filing
and indexing in the public land records." Id. One possible solution for
jurisdictions with antiquated recording systems, besides fixing the recording
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Consumer advocates could argue that the Elder HELP
Instrument, because it puts the burden on the homeowner to sign it
and record it, would provide protection only to those borrowers
already best able to protect themselves even without the protections
of the document. Clearly, the Elder HELP Instrument program is in
no way an acceptable replacement or alternative for existing or
proposed measures designed to provide protections to all
homeowners signing high-cost loans. State anti-predatory lending
legislation, such as Georgia's, New York's, and North Carolina's, is
the crucial front line defense in protecting borrowers from predatory
lending.284 The homeowners most likely to be victims of predatory
lending need protections that do not depend on the homeowner's
own understanding or knowledge of available legal restrictions. The
Elder HELP Instrument program would, however, provide useful
additional benefits above and beyond the general predatory lending
bills to those who seek its protection.
A risk in this proposal is that lenders could argue that any
homeowner who did not sign an Elder HELP Instrument could be
presumed to desire a high-cost loan, that the absence of this
instrument indicates somehow the desire to enter into a loan that
would violate the instrument. An elder might have numerous
reasons for not signing the instrument that have nothing to do with
whether the elder desires to sign a high-cost loan, however, with
subterfuge by the lender or simple ignorance being high on the list.
Therefore, any enactment of this program should include the express
statement that no inferences or presumptions may be drawn against
the homeowner for the failure to sign an Elder HELP Instrument.
Nor should any presumptions be drawn against a homeowner by the
fact that the homeowner has withdrawn an Elder HELP Instrument,
system itself, would be to have the Elder HELP Instrument have a short delay
in taking effect until a set period goes by or it appears on the index, whichever
is earlier, with the borrower instructed that the protection will take that period
of time to take effect. The Elder HELP Instrument should be immediately
binding upon any lender when either the lender or any of its agents have
knowledge of it, however.
284. See discussion of state anti-predatory legislation supra notes 65-92 and
accompanying text.
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because that act might be the result of an especially convincing
mortgage broker or less than competent counseling.
The proposal could be criticized for relying on the existence of
adequately trained and affordable independent home-loan counselors
to allow those seniors who do want to sign loans that violate the
instrument to free themselves from its bonds. In this regard, this
proposal is similar to the North Carolina bill requiring counseling for
homeowners who might sign high-cost loans. 2 85 Efforts should be
made to ensure that the counselors are not merely wolves in sheep's
clothing, or mortgage brokers seeking to earn money on the side by
counseling borrowers to enter into high-cost loans. While some
agencies provide valuable counseling to potential borrowers, there is
insufficient funding in many areas for effective counseling, and the
opportunities for borrowers to receive personally tailored, timely and
accurate information and counseling are severely lacking.286 This
lack of counseling is a problem that should be addressed with or
without the Elder HELP Instrument program. A more effective and
widespread counseling system could be funded by a fee attached to
the recording process, much as California has funded programs
designed to prevent predatory lending with such fees.287
Another criticism might be that if some states allow Elder HELP
Instruments while others do not, that disparity would contribute to
the patchwork nature of laws designed to prevent predatory lending
and detract from the smooth flow of credit to all parts of the
288country. To avoid not only that hazard but also the possibility of
285. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (discussing the North
Carolina anti-predatory lending legislation).
286. For a discussion of the great promise of effective counseling as well as
the limited counseling currently available, see Harkness, supra note 44, at 41-
43.
287. See CAL. GOv'T CODE § 27388 (West Supp. 2002) (providing that a fee
of up to two dollars may be imposed on the recording of any instrument except
those exempt from recording fees, upon the adoption of a resolution mandating
such a fee by the county board of supervisors).
288. See Donald C. Lampe, Predatory Lending Initiatives, Legislation and
Litigation: Federal Regulation, State Law and Preemption, 56 CONSUMER FIN.
L.Q. REP. 78, 84 (2002).
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federal preemption, Elder HELP Instruments could be authorized at
the federal level.289
One last criticism is that, if this program would indeed protect
homeowners from predatory lending, it should not be restricted to the
elderly. If it were made universal, there would not be even the hint
of "new ageism" or "compassionate ageism" in its enactment. The
use of HELP Instruments would have a greater restricting effect on
property and its recording if the use of these instruments were
extended to the non-elderly, since the non-elderly may live in their
homes much longer than their older equivalents. A homeowner who
buys a home at age twenty-five could conceivably live there for
seventy years of more. This long duration may increase the
possibility of lenders failing to note the HELP Instrument in the
property record if it were recorded many decades previously.
Furthermore, lending conditions may change so much during the
span of numerous decades that the interest and fee assumptions used
to design the HELP Instrument would not match the market as
closely as they did when the instrument was originally drafted.
Therefore, if HELP Instruments are extended to the non-elderly, then
their use could arguably be time-limited, so that the homeowner
would have to refile at the end of a set period of time, such as every
twenty years. Such an expiration date is problematic, as the
homeowner is unlikely to remember when the protection expires so
as to renew it. The homeowner may unexpectedly find himself
vulnerable to overpriced loans. Even though limitations of autonomy
289. Lenders would no doubt argue that a state Elder HELP Instrument
program was preempted by federal law, including the Alternative Mortgage
Transactions Parity Act of 1982 (AMTPA), Pub. L. No. 97-320, §§ 801-807,
96 Stat. 1469, 1545-48 (1982), the Depository Institutions Deregulation and
Monetary Control Act of 1980 (DIDMCA), Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132
(1980), and the Riegle-Nagel Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act
of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (codified as amended in various
sections of 12 U.S.C.). The issue of federal preemption of state and local anti-
predatory lending enactments will likely be one of the most important
battlegrounds in this area of law and a full discussion of the likelihood of
preemption in this area is beyond the scope of this Article. For a useful
discussion of the possibility of federal preeemption of state and local
enactments regarding predatory lending, see Lampe, supra, note 288, at 84-86.
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are less worrisome if they are of short duration, this may be an
instance where such a specific time limitation creates too great a
danger, especially given that the homeowner can be released from
the limitation through a simple affirmative act.
XI. CONCLUSION
The elderly are special targets of predatory lending and tend to
suffer more severely when they become its victims. However, most
seniors are competent and able to handle their own affairs, and may
resent broadly drawn, special protections aimed solely at older
homeowners as an undue restriction of their freedom. I have
proposed a system that would protect seniors who desire to free
themselves of the fear of predatory lending by limiting their own
autonomy, without limiting the freedom of other seniors who do not
desire additional protections. This system of recording notices of the
self-limitation of autonomy would both respect the autonomy of the
elderly while protecting those whose autonomy would be enhanced
more by protection than by unrestrained freedom to contract. Like
Ulysses, lashed to the mast, elderly homeowners who choose this
protection could resist the siren song of predatory lenders and arrive
at very old age, safe at home.
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